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ABSTRACT 
According to Roediger and McDermott (1995), a false memory is a memory of an 
event that never occurred.  A large body of research has explored the false memory effect 
and the factors that influence false memory production.  The purpose of the present study 
was twofold.  The first aim was to examine the extent to which a participant’s confidence 
in their overall memory ability influences the production of false memories.  The second 
aim was to explore the extent to which fluctuations in memory confidence potentially 
influence fluctuations in the false memory phenomenon.  To these aims, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups: high-confidence group, low-confidence group, 
or neutral group.  Participants received positive, negative, or neutral feedback about their 
memory performance on three different memory tests in an attempt to experimentally 
manipulate participants’ confidence in their memory.  Using the Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) paradigm, participants were administered a total of 32 word lists and 
were administered a recall test after each list was presented.  Each list contained 15 words 
associated with one non-presented word (critical lure).  After all 32 lists were presented, 
participants completed a recognition test in which they were asked to identify the words 
presented on each list and to make remember, know, and guess judgments (Tulving, 
1985).  The analysis on the recall and the recognition test revealed a false memory effect: 
studied items were recalled and recognized at a higher rate than critical lures which in 
turn were recalled and recognized at a higher rate than non-critical intrusions or new 
words.  No significant differences between the three memory manipulation conditions 
were observed, indicating that the memory manipulation did not affect false memory 
production. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research in memory has been guided by Bartlett’s (1932) assertion that memory 
is reconstructive rather than photographic in nature.  In one experiment, Bartlett (1932) 
had participants listen to a North American folk-tale called “A War of the Ghosts.”  After 
a period of time, participants were asked to recall the story as accurately as possible.  
Bartlett found that participant’s recollections typically contained the key information of 
the folk-tale, but the specific details of the story were often either missing or incorrect.  
After further research, he proposed that humans do not have photographic memories and 
that information retrieved from memory is not always accurate.   
On the basis of his research, Bartlett (1932) argued that memorial information is 
reconstructed using information from both the actual event and an individual’s previous 
experience with similar events.  The exact (or verbatim) information is used to form a 
general framework in which the specific details are incorporated.  Bartlett argued that, 
because the specific details of an event are likely to be forgotten quickly, humans 
probably generate the details of an event using memories of similar experiences.  Thus, 
when an individual is attempting to recall or recollect an event, the framework is rarely 
missing or erroneous, but the specific details may be forgotten or incorrect.   
The reconstructive nature of memory has also raised issues outside the laboratory.  
Psychologists and psychiatrists have used hypnosis to help their patients or clients 
“remember” traumatic events that happened to them during their childhood.  This use of 
hypnosis has become a hot topic, as some researchers have suggest that some of 
“recovered” memories by patients undergoing therapy are the result of suggestive or 
leading statements made by the therapist while the patient underwent hypnosis (e.g., 
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Steblay, Mehrkens & Bothwell, 1994).  In some unfortunate circumstances, patients have 
falsely accused family members, friends, or acquaintances of crimes that were never 
committed (e.g. sexual abuse).  In recent years, the accuracy and appropriate use of 
eyewitness testimony has also been called into question.  The current consensus is that 
there are many factors that influence the accuracy of an eyewitness’s testimony (Cutler, 
Penrod and Martens, 1987b; Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989; Shapiro & Penrod,1986), 
and that at least under certain circumstances, eyewitness accounts can be wholly 
inaccurate (Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999). 
 James Deese (Deese, 1957; Deese, 1959; Deese & Hardman, 1954) was the first 
to conduct laboratory investigations of false-memory construction.  In his research, 
participants were administered 36 word lists that contained 12 items each.  Each list 
contained 12 words all semantically related to one non-presented word.  For example, 
one list included the words hard, light, pillow, plush, loud and cotton and the highly 
associated word that was not presented on the list (i.e., the critical lure) was soft.  The 
lists were randomized in five different orders, and presented auditorily.  Participants 
orally recalled the words that were presented on each list.  Deese calculated the 
percentage the critical lure was recalled and found that some lists produced few critical 
lures (butterfly = 0%) while other lists produced the critical lure at a much higher rate 
(sleep = 44%).  He hypothesized that participants recalled the critical lure because the 
words on the lists activated other highly associated words not presented on the lists.  The 
participants then recalled these highly semantically related words thinking that they 
actually appeared on the lists.   
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In order to explore this hypothesis, he administered a free-association test 
consisting of all the words from the 36 lists.  He instructed participants to report the first 
word that came to their mind for each word that was presented from the 36 memory lists.  
He calculated the association strength for each word by summing the number of times the 
critical lure was paired with each word.  The mean association strength for the entire list 
was calculated by summing the strength of the each word’s association to the critical lure 
and dividing that sum by the number of words on the list.   Using this information, Deese 
calculated the relationship between the frequency that the critical lure was recalled to the 
mean association strength of the lists to establish the probability that critical lure would 
be recalled for each list.  He found a positive linear correlation between the mean 
association strength of a list, and the recall of the critical lure (P Recall of Critical Lure = 
3.7 + 1.63*mean association strength of a list; r = .873).  Using this relation, if the mean 
association strength of a list was 60%, the probability of the critical lure being recalled 
would be 1.0.   On the basis of the strength of the relation between the recall of critical 
lures and the mean association strength, Deese concluded that the words on each memory 
list activated other semantically related words that were subsequently incorrectly reported 
as studied words at recall (Deese, 1959). 
Recently, Roediger and McDermott (1995) sought to replicate Deese’s (1959) 
findings using 6 lists that produced the largest number of critical lures in Deese's study in 
an attempt to extend their findings to recognition memory.  In the first experiment, 
participants were read words one a time from a word list.  At the end of each list, 
participants were told to write down as many words from the list that they could 
remember.  After all the lists were administered, participants completed a recognition test 
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that contained two weakly related words from each of the studied lists, the critical lures 
from each list, and several unstudied words.  For each word, participants were also 
instructed to rate that word from 1 (sure it was new) to 4 (sure it was old) to indicate 
whether each word presented was on one of the studied word lists or if it was a new 
word. 
Results revealed that the studied words were recalled at a rate of .65, and the 
critical lures were recalled at a rate of .40 (Roediger & McDermott, 1995, Experiment 1).  
Words that had not been presented on the lists were recalled at a rate of .14.  These 
results indicate that the studied words were recalled more frequently than the critical 
lures, and that the critical lures were produced at a significantly higher rate than the non-
studied words.  Similar results were obtained on the recognition test.  That is, studied 
words rated as either a 3 or 4 (old) were recognized .86 of the time, critical lures rated as 
either a 3 or 4 were recognized .84 of the time, and words that had not been presented 
(new words) were recognized as old .02 or the time.  Although critical lures were not 
recognized at the same rate as studied items, critical lures were recognized as being old 
significantly more often than items that had not been presented on the lists.  Taken 
together, these findings replicate Deese's (1959) results and indicate that the false 
memory phenomenon can be observed in both recall and recognition.   
In a second experiment, Roediger and McDermott were interested in determining 
whether participants identified critical lures as 'old' on a recognition test because they 
actually remembered hearing the critical lures or because they simply were responding to 
a feeling of knowing that the critical lures were on the lists.  In their experiment, they 
used word lists similar to those constructed by Deese (1959), except that each of the 15 
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words in each list was highly semantically related to one word that was not presented on 
the list.  For example, one list included the words hard, light, pillow, plush, loud and 
cotton and the highly associated word that was not presented on the list (i.e., the critical 
lure) was soft.   
After each list was presented, participants either performed a recall test or 
completed a math test.  The inclusion of a math test after half the lists enabled Roediger 
and McDermott to determine whether recalling a list immediately after it had been 
presented would affect recognition performance.  After all 16 lists were presented, 
participants completed a recognition test similar to that presented in their original 
experiment and indicated whether each word was “old” or “new”.  In addition, for all 
items rated as 'old', participants indicated whether they actually remembered the word 
being presented (remember) or if they just knew the word was in the list (know).  The 
remember/know procedure, introduced by Tulving (1985), was adapted to examine the 
nature of the memory for the critical lure in order to explicitly determine whether the 
information participants recalled or recognized was retrieved from specific 
representations in memory or simply from strong feelings of familiarity. 
Results revealed that studied words were recalled at a probability of .62 while the 
critical lure was recalled at a probability of .55, replicating the results obtained in 
Roediger and McDermott's (1995) first experiment.  For those participants who recalled 
the studied items immediately following presentation, studied items were correctly 
recognized at a rate of .79 and these were identified as remembered at a rate of .57.  The 
critical lures were correctly recognized at a rate of .81.  For those participants who 
performed the arithmetic test immediately after each list was presented, participants 
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correctly recognized the studied items at a rate of .65 and identified them as remembered 
at a rate of .41.  The critical lures from the lists that were followed by arithmetic 
problems were incorrectly recognized at a rate of .72 and identified as old at a rate of .38, 
and identified as being remembered at a rate of .38.  Not surprisingly, results revealed 
that recalling information immediately after it is presented facilitates later recognition of 
that information as well as increasing the probability of remembering that word as having 
been presented on one of the word lists. 
On the basis of the results from both experiments, Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) concluded that the pattern of memory performance that they obtained could be 
explained using a more general theory of memory called spreading activation.  In this 
theory, memory is represented as a framework of interconnected nodes.   A node is 
essentially a concept or a piece of information that is linked to several other concepts.  
Consider the word soft.  This word is highly interrelated to other words such as hard, 
cotton, and loud.  As such, each of these words would be represented as a separate node 
in a network and the relationships between these words would be reflected by their 
connections.  The links between nodes are created on the basis of experience with those 
words and the strength of the connection is based on various criteria that designate the 
importance of that relationship.  For the present discussion, it is sufficient to assume that 
each of the connections between the words is of the same strength.  One possible network 
that specifies these relationships is portrayed in Figure 1.  Hard is connected with soft and 
cotton because they are semantically associated with one another (because connections in 
a network of this type can represent synonym or antonym associations).  However, 
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because loud is only associated with soft, there are no connections between loud and any 
of the other words in the network.   
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Soft
Hard
Cotton
Loud
Figure 1.  Example of a spreading activation network for the word ‘soft’.
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The process of memory retrieval begins with an input, which activates one node.  
Activation then spreads from that node to other nodes that are linked to it.  Nodes that are 
not linked to the nodes that become activated are unaffected.  As other inputs activate 
other nodes in the network, activation spreads from those nodes to the other nodes that 
are connected to them. Each activation of a node leads that node to become more and 
more activated such that all the activations sum together.  The most highly activated 
node(s) in a network will comprise what is recalled or recognized at any given time.  If 
too much time passes between activation of information in a network, retrieval or 
recognition may not be possible because activation in a network decays exponentially 
(Bechtel & Abrahamson, 1991).  
Roediger and McDermott (1995) used the theory of semantic activation to explain 
their results.  Specifically, they argued that each word in a list and any high-associates of 
those words (e.g., soft) would be nodes in an interconnected network.  As each word in 
the list is activated, activation would also spread to other connected nodes, including the 
critical lure node, ‘soft’.  Because all the words in the word lists administered were high 
associates of the word soft, that node would receive large amounts of activation over the 
course of a list.  After all the words in a list are presented, the node for each presented 
word and the node for the critical lure would have some level of activation above zero.  
At recall or recognition, any node that is activated above some threshold amount will be 
recalled or recognized as having been on the list.   
Although Roediger and McDermott (1995) used the spreading activation theory to 
explain their data, several other theories have been proposed to explain why false 
memories occur.  Specifically, the implicit activation hypothesis (Underwood, 1965), the 
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source monitoring theory (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993), the fuzzy-trace theory 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1990), and the criterion-shift theory (Miller & Wolford, 1999).   
Implicit Activation Hypothesis 
Underwood (1965) proposed the implicit activation hypothesis to account for 
false-memory construction.  Similar to the spreading activation theory, Underwood’s 
hypothesis concentrates on the nature of the processing of semantically associated words 
that are not presented on the word lists.   Specifically, Underwood argues that the critical 
lure is unintentionally or unconsciously activated as a result of activating words that are 
highly associated with it, whereas Roediger and McDermott (1995) do not make any 
assumptions regarding the conscious or unconscious activation of this information.  
According to Underwood, the critical lure and other non-presented words are encoded 
during the list presentation as if they had been presented.  Thus, in recall and recognition 
tests, the critical lures should act similarly to studied items.  For example, when an 
individual sees a list that contains the words, hard, light, pillow, plush, loud and cotton, 
the word soft is automatically, but implicitly activated.  At recall, the individual should 
write the word soft down because it was encoded in the same fashion as all the other 
words in the list.  At recognition, the individual would recognize the word soft as being a 
studied item for the same reasons.   
The implicit activation theory would uniquely predict that false memories would 
still be generated in experiments in which the word lists are presented below participant's 
conscious level of encoding (e.g., 50 ms.).  This prediction has been tested recently by 
Seamon, Luo, and Gallo (1998).  They tested Underwood’s hypothesis that critical lures 
are unconsciously activated using two methods that would minimize the explicit 
 
11 
activation of the critical lure: near-threshold presentation rates and concurrent memory 
load.  In the first experiment, two groups were tested: the concurrent memory load group, 
in which participants were given a digit sequence to memorize before the first list was 
given; and a control group, in which participants received no digit sequences to 
memorize.  Participants in both groups saw words presented for 20 ms, 250 ms, and 2 s.  
After all the lists had been presented, participants were administered a recognition test.   
Results revealed that hit rates were lower for those in the concurrent memory 
group than those in the control group.  Correct recognition was also lower at near 
threshold presentation rates (20 ms) than slow presentations (250 ms and 2 ms).   With 
regard to false recognition of the critical lure, the concurrent memory group showed 
lower false recognition rates than in the control group when the presentation rate was 250 
ms and 20 ms. This is an important finding because it suggests that the false memory 
phenomenon is, at least to some extent, the result of an implicit activation of critical 
lures.   
In a second experiment, Seamon et al. (1998) attempted to replicate these findings 
using a within-subjects design.  In this experiment, participants were administered four 
lists under concurrent memory load conditions and four lists under normal conditions.  
Not surprisingly, hit rates were lower for lists under concurrent memory loads than lists 
under normal conditions.  Correct recognition for studied items and false alarms for 
critical lures was lower at shorter presentation rates than at longer presentation rates, 
consistent with the findings from Experiment 1.  However, critical lures were still falsely 
recognized at all presentation rates.  On the basis of this research, Seamon et al. (1998) 
concluded that these results could only be obtained if the words on the lists activated the 
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critical lure unconsciously, as Underwood (1965) suggested.   In other words, the 
activation of the both the words and the critical lure were done automatically, without 
any conscious thought from the participants. 
As the participants would not be able to consciously encode the words from the 
list, no differences between remember and know judgments would be predicted under the 
implicit activation hypothesis framework.   
Source Monitoring Theory 
 The source monitoring theory (Johnson et al., 1993) is a framework that is based 
on a more general theoretical framework of memory functioning.  From this perspective, 
each event is stored in memory in conjunction with certain perceptual (e.g., color, texture, 
or sound), contextual (e.g., spatial or temporal), and reflective or affective (e.g., 
emotional reactions or semantic associations) characteristics.  For example, the 
experience of hearing the word ‘hard’ might be stored in memory with other 
characteristics such as it’s position in the list, the tone of voice of the experimenter, and 
any images that may have been spontaneously produced when the participant heard the 
word.   
Johnson et al., (1993) argued that the ability for a participant to determine 
whether a specific word was presented on a list involves the activation of that memory 
and the activation of any additional characteristics stored with that memory.  When 
probed about an event, a little or a lot of additional information may be necessary in order 
to judge whether that event was real, imagined, in the recent past, or in the distant past.  
The more characteristics a memory has associated with it, the greater the likelihood that it 
will pass the source monitoring test and be considered a memory of a true experience.  
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Johnson et al. (1993) are careful to point out that the quality of the information stored in 
memory at encoding is critical to later retrieval.  If the information at encoding is 
inaccurate or invalid in some way, the source monitoring process may go awry and yield 
faulty conclusions about later retrieved information.   
According to the source monitoring theory, false memories can result from two 
underlying factors (Johnson et al., 1993).  Participants may confuse the additional 
characteristics of true memories and may generalize them to related information that was 
not presented.  Alternatively, there may be individual and/or developmental differences 
in the extent to which participants can store and effectively use such additional 
characteristics in order to accurately judge the source of a memory.  In either case, the 
source monitoring theory would posit that the false memory phenomenon is a result of 
the faulty or inappropriate use of the additional characteristics of information stored in 
memory.  In terms of remember and know judgments, participants would report that they 
remember an item in situations where source information (correct or incorrect) is 
available.  On the other hand, know judgments would be made even when the source 
information is weak. 
Fuzzy Trace Theory 
 Brainerd and Reyna (1990) have argued that memorial information is encoded 
and stored in two forms: general gist and verbatim.  General gist memory consists of 
information about the overall meaning of an event whereas verbatim memory consists of 
the exact details of an event (Brainerd et al, 1990).  Consider a situation in which 
participants study a list of words that are all semantically related.  In this situation, 
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individuals form a gist representation based on the semantic content of those words while 
simultaneously encoding the exact details of the information being presented.   
On recall or recognition tests, individuals can identify words that are remembered 
verbatim (e.g., light, pillow, cotton), words that semantically fit the gist (e.g., soft, 
feather, white), or both.  From this perspective, Brainerd and Reyna (1990) have argued 
that false memories or memories for information not presented result from an individual 
relying on gist-based information rather than verbatim information in memory.  In terms 
of remember and know judgments, the participant would indicate they remember the item 
when it is based upon verbatim traces, and alternatively, would indicate they know the 
item was present when the decision is based more on gist traces. 
Criterion Shift Theory 
 Criterion shift theory is concerned with variations in the decision processes that 
are used when individuals make recall or recognition decisions about information stored 
in memory.  In essence, this theory proposes that all participants have an implicit set of 
rules or guidelines that they follow when retrieving or recalling information from 
memory.  Such criteria can be altered by the individual, through experimenter 
instructions, or by the situation at hand.   
For example, suppose a doctor is asked to recall what medication should be 
administered to a patient who has diabetes.  In this circumstance, because the 
consequence of making a mistake in recollection is high, that doctor would likely set a 
very high criterion on the retrieval of all possible drug information in order to ensure that 
the correct drug is retrieved.  In contrast, suppose a 90-year-old adult is asked whether 
he/she had chocolate cake for his/her 5th birthday party.  The consequence for recalling 
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incorrect information is small, and therefore, a less stringent criterion would be set so that 
any potential information about that event would have a chance to be recalled. 
When participants are asked to recall or recognize information presented in a 
word list, they will adopt some criterion between one that is strict and one that is lenient.  
Participants who adopt a stricter criterion will recall only those words that they are 
absolutely sure that they remember hearing whereas participants who adopt a more 
lenient criterion may recall words from the list in addition to other words that were not 
presented.  According to Miller and Wolford (1999), false memories in the Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) paradigm result from participants using a less stringent criterion for 
recall and recognition as a result of the nature of the word lists.  That is, because the word 
lists contain items that are highly semantically related to one another, participants may be 
more likely to say that the critical lure is old simply because it is related to other words 
that were on the list. Therefore false alarms to critical lures represent individual 
differences in the criterion used for recall and recognition of memorial information and 
not the production of a false memory.  Within an individual, the number of remember and 
know judgments would fluctuate depending on how liberal a criterion that individual 
adopts.  Setting a strict criterion, would yield more remember responses whereas setting a 
lenient criterion would results in more know judgments. 
Factors that Influence False Memory 
 A considerable amount of research has been conducted to determine the factors 
that influence false-memory construction.  A discussion of the major factors is presented 
below. 
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Presentation 
As mentioned above, Seamon et al., (1998) tested Underwood’s (1965) 
hypothesis that critical lures are unconsciously activated using two methods that would 
minimize the explicit activation of the critical lure: near-threshold presentation rates and 
concurrent memory load.  Their two experiments showed that critical lures were still 
recalled when presentation rates did not allow for correct recognition of studied items.  
This lends support for the idea that critical lures are, to some extent, due to implicit 
activation.   
Modality 
Several studies have examined how the manner in which the lists are presented 
affects false-memory construction.  Smith and Hunt (1998; Experiment 1) used the 5 
most highly associated words from 10 randomly chosen lists from Roediger and 
McDermott (1995).  The words were presented to participants as one 50-word list.  The 
list was presented to the participant either aurally or visually, which was then followed by 
a written free recall test.  The results indicated that when the words were presented 
aurally, recall of the studied words and critical lures did not differ significantly.  On the 
other hand, when the words were presented visually, studied items were recalled at 
almost twice the rate as critical lures.  In a second experiment, Smith and Hunt (1998; 
Experiment 2) sought to extend these findings to a recognition test.  Twelve words from 
the same six lists were presented either visually or aurally, and after each list, participants 
recalled as many words as they could.  A recognition test was administered at the 
conclusion of the list presentation.  The results of the recall and recognition test 
replicated the results from Experiment 1.  Specifically, studied items were recognized at a 
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higher rate than critical lures when the words was presented visually, but recognition did 
not differ between studied items and critical lures when the words were presented aurally.  
These results were the first indication that the modality of the presentation of the lists had 
an effect on false-memory construction. 
Kellog (2001) further investigated the results from Smith and Hunt (1998) by 
manipulating the test modality of the paradigm as well as the presentation.  Sixteen lists 
from Roediger and McDermott (1995) were split into four groups of four lists and were 
either presented aurally or visually in a within group design.  After the visual or aural 
presentation of each list, participants were asked to recall as many words as possible by 
either writing the words down or saying them out loud.  The results replicated the 
findings from Smith and Hunt (1998) for written recall: fewer critical lures were recalled 
when the lists were presented visually than when they were presented aurally.  However, 
no difference was observed in the rate of recall of critical lures when recall was spoken 
rather than written.  Thus, the presentation modality did have an effect on the recall of 
critical lures, whereas the recall modality did not.  
In a similar study, Maylor and Mo (1999) used 12 lists from Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) and created a recognition test for each of the 12 lists.  Lists were 
either presented visually or aurally and the recognition test was administered either 
visually or aurally in a with-in subjects design.  The results showed that correct 
recognition of studied items was higher with auditory presentation than with visual 
presentation.  On the other hand, false recognition of the critical lure was higher with 
visual presentation than with auditory presentation.  Furthermore, false recognition rates 
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were highest when the study and test modalities differed, for example, if the words were 
presented visually and the recognition test was auditory. 
Based upon the source monitoring theory, participants should be most accurate in 
recalling or recognizing studied words when the recall or recognition test is administered 
using the same modality as the modality in which the words were presented because the 
source is the same? (Tulving & Thompson, 1973).  False recall and recognition of critical 
lures should be highest when the modality of the presentation and the test are opposite, as 
was shown by Maylor and Mo (1999).    
Gallo, McDermott, Percer and Roediger (2001) attempted to shed light on these 
conflicting findings of presentation modality.  For all three experiments in their study, 
they followed the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm, yet manipulated the 
presentation and test modality as well as the between/within subjects design.  In 
Experiment 1, 24 lists were presented to the participants, and half were followed by math 
problems and half were followed by immediate recall.  At the conclusion of the recall 
portion, participants were given the recognition test which contained words from 
positions 3, 8, 10, and the critical lure from the lists that were presented as well unstudied 
items.  They were asked to indicate if the word had been presented and to make the 
remember/know judgment.  They were then given the same recognition test, yet this time 
they were asked to indicate if the word had been presented or not, and if it had been 
presented, if it was presented auditorily, visually, or if they did not know. 
The results showed that the study modality had an effect upon critical lures, as 
they were recalled at a higher rate following auditory presentation than after visual 
presentation, replicated Smith and Hunt’s (1998) findings.  This was also found with the 
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recognition of critical lures, although it was smaller than the effect found in recall.  
Analysis on the remember/know judgments revealed that studied items and critical lures 
were judged as remembered more often when the corresponding list had been presented 
auditorily than visually.  Results from the modality judgment revealed that participants 
were quite accurate in their judgment.  In addition, critical lures were categorized as 
having been presented in the same modality as the corresponding list, and this was done 
at the same level of studied items.  The results replicated those from Smith and Hunt 
(1998) although with a smaller effect. 
Experiment 2 was designed to examine if test modality had an effect on the recall 
and recognition of studied items and critical lures.  Twenty-four lists were presented to 
the participant, either visually or aurally in a blocked design, so that 12 lists were 
presented aurally followed by 12 presented visually, or 12 lists were presented visually 
followed by 12 presented aurally.  After the presentation of the lists was complete, the 
participant was given the recognition test.  The recognition test comprised of words 1, 8, 
10, and the critical lure from lists presented in addition to new items.  Half of the items 
from the lists that were presented aurally were presented visually on the recognition test 
and the other half were presented aurally on the recognition test.  In addition, half of the 
items from the lists that were presented visually were presented aurally on the recognition 
test and the other half were presented visually.  Half of the new items were presented 
aurally and the other half visually.  The remember/know judgments were expanded, and 
participants were asked to indicate if the remembered the item, knew the item had been 
presented, or if they were guessing the item had been presented, and they had no feelings 
of remembering or knowing.   
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The results indicated that test modality did have an effect on studied items and 
critical lures.  False recognition of critical lures was higher with visual presentation than 
with auditory presentation. In addition, critical lures visually presented were falsely 
recognized at a higher rate with visual test than when the critical lures were presented 
visually and then auditorily tested.  When the critical lures were presented auditorily, 
there was no difference in the test modality.   Correct recognition of studied items was 
higher with visual presentation than with auditory presentation.  In addition, studied items 
visually presented were correctly recognized at a higher rate with visual test than when 
the studied items were presented visually and then auditorily tested.  When the studied 
items were presented auditorily, there was no difference in the test modality.  Further, the 
rate of correct recognition of studied items was higher than the false recognition of 
critical lures in every case, except when the list was presented auditorily with visual test.  
Analysis of the Remember/Know/Guess judgments revealed that Remember judgments 
of studied items were greater than Remember judgments of critical lures except when the 
lists were presented aurally with a visual recognition test, when they were judged as 
remembered at the same rate.  Again, these results are consistent with the findings of 
Smith and Hunt (1998) and are not consistent with the findings of Maylor and Mo (1999).   
Experiment 3 was an attempt to replicate the findings from Maylor and Mo 
(1999).  The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2, yet with a between-subjects 
design.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: auditory 
presentation-auditory test, auditory presentation-visual test, visual presentation-visual 
test, visual presentation-auditory test.  The procedure and recognition test was the same 
as in Experiment 2.   
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 As in Experiment 2, critical lures were falsely recognized at higher rates in visual 
presentation than with auditory presentation, and studied items were correctly recognized 
with visual presentation than with auditory presentation.  There were no statistically 
significant findings concerning critical lures between the four conditions, although this 
was most likely due to the weaker between-subjects design.  However, for studied items, 
when the presentation modality and the test modality were the same, correct recognition 
of studied items was higher than when they were not the same.  This result was partially 
consistent with Experiment 2, as visual presentation with visual test produced higher 
rates of correct recognition than all the other conditions.  Consistent with Experiment 2, 
the rate of correct recognition of studied items was higher than the false recognition of 
critical lures in every case, except when the list was presented auditorily with visual test.  
Analysis of the Remember/Know/Guess showed that Remember judgments of studied 
items were greater than Remember judgments of critical lures except when the lists were 
presented aurally with a visual recognition test, when they were judged as remembered at 
the same rate. 
The spreading activation theory, fuzzy-trace theory, and the implicit activation 
theory would have difficulty explaining these results, as the presentation modality should 
have little effect upon the level of activation in both of these theories.  On the other hand, 
Gallo et al. (2001) have argued that the source monitoring theory can explain the 
consistent findings of Smith and Hunt (1998), Kellog (2001), and Gallo, McDermott et 
al. (2001).  Specifically, it is posited that participants have better source monitoring 
ability with visual presentation than auditory presentation because items presented with a 
visual modality are better encoded and more salient than in the auditory modality.  
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However, the variability of the findings warrants more research before a good 
explanation would fit any of the theories. 
Distinctiveness 
The distinctiveness heuristic is based upon the source monitoring theory in which 
individuals use decision strategies when evaluating information by trying to attribute the 
information to a source.  It has been shown that individuals shown pictorial stimuli make 
their decisions on the basis of their ability to attribute it to a source (reference).  Dobson 
and Schachter (2001) wanted to extend these findings to the Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) paradigm.  In Experiment 1, they had participants view 18 lists from Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) and half the participants were instructed to say the word on the screen 
and the other half heard the word being said while it was on the screen.  All participants 
were then administered a visual recognition test  
The results showed that critical lures were falsely recognized at a higher rate 
when the participants heard the words than when they said the words, although there was 
no difference between the two conditions in the rate of recognition of studied items.  In 
the hearing condition, studied items and critical lures were recognized at the same rate, 
although in the saying condition, critical lures were recognized at a significantly lower 
rate than studied items.  Yet, participants in the say condition did not show a reduction of 
false recognition of new items, which would have been expected by distinctiveness 
heuristic, leading Dobson and Schachter (2001) to believe that the distinctiveness 
heuristic was being used in some situations and not others. 
To test this idea, Dobson and Schachter (2001) created a within subjects design in 
Experiment 2, in which 8 lists were heard by the participant and 8 lists were spoken.  The 
 
23 
results from this experiment showed that participants in the say condition had a lower rate 
of false recognition of new items and higher rates of correct recognition of studied items 
compared to participants in the hear condition.  Yet the two conditions did not differ in 
the rate of false recognition of critical lures.  Their results indicated that participants had 
difficulty using the distinctiveness heuristic when two types of encoding were used.  
These results, taken together with the results from Experiment 1 indicate that the 
distinctiveness heuristic is one decision strategy that can be used by participant in the 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm. 
As Dobson and Schachter (2001) were studying an aspect directly related to the 
source monitoring theory, their results can be explained, albeit not as neatly, by other 
theories.  The spreading activation theory, the fuzzy-trace theory, and the criterion shift 
theory would all presume that different strategies, or thresholds, could be utilized when 
making decisions in the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm. Although all three 
theories would be able to explain the results from Experiment 1, none of them could 
adequately be able to predict the results from Experiment 2.   
Gallo, McDermott, Percer and Roediger (2001) were also interested if participants 
used a distinctiveness heuristic in Experiment 3 (mentioned above).  They argued that 
when modality effects are manipulated in a within subjects design, the participant relies 
on list-specific information, while a between-subjects design would allow the participant 
to make decisions based upon both list-specific information and the distinctiveness 
heuristic, thereby reducing false recognition of critical lures.  The distinctiveness 
heuristic is able to somewhat explain the results from the three experiments.  In the case 
of visual presentation, participants are less likely to falsely recall or recognize the critical 
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lure because there was no visual recollection for them.  Yet there were no differences in 
the rates of false recognition of the critical lure between Experiment 2 (within subjects 
design) and Experiment 3 (between subjects design), a finding that is contrary to the 
predictions made with the distinctiveness heuristic.  This led the authors to conclude that 
participants based their decisions on list-specific modality information rather than the 
distinctiveness heuristic.   
Delay 
Previous studies have investigated the effects of a delay before a free recall test, 
yet little was known about how a delay would affect false-memory construction in the 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm.  McDermott (1996) designed an experiment 
in which a delay was imposed before the administration of a recall test.  Specifically, 
immediately after being presented with word lists, one group of participants recalled as 
many of the words in the list as they could in 90 s and then completed math problems for 
30 s.  The other group of participants completed 30 s of math problems followed by a 90-
second recall test.  An additional free recall test was administered 48 hours after the first 
testing session was completed.   
Results revealed that the 30-second delay before recall lowered the correct recall 
of studied items, but it did not affect the false recall of critical lures, consistent with 
results obtained by Roediger and McDermott (1995).  Results from the free recall test 
two days later revealed that critical lures were recalled at a higher rate than studied items.  
This result is interesting because one might predict that recall at long delays would be 
poorer than at short delays due to simple decay of trace information in memory.  No 
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theory of decay can explain why critical lures are retrieved at a higher rate than studied 
items.   
Thapar and McDermott (2001) further examined the effects of delay on false 
memory construction by also manipulating the level the participants processed the words 
on the list.  In Experiment 1, participants were directed to rate the pleasantness of the 
meaning (deep processing) of the word for 8 lists, the number of vowels (shallow 
processing) in each word for 8 lists, and the color (shallow processing) of the words for 8 
lists as they were presented.  Participants were then asked to immediately do a free recall 
test, or asked to return in either 2 or 7 days to complete the free recall test.  Results from 
Experiment 1 indicated a significant decrease in the rate of recall of studied items and 
critical lures over time, although this was more dramatic with studied items than with 
critical lures.  Initially the probability of recalling a studied item was higher than 
recalling a critical lure (immediate) although after 7 days, critical lures were recalled at 
higher rates than studied items.  In addition, lists which were deeply processed were more 
likely to produce the studied items and critical lures at all three time intervals than lists 
shallowly processed.   
A second experiment was conducted to replicate and extend these findings using a 
recognition test.  The procedure was similar and the results showed the same trends 
observed in the recall data in the recognition data.  Thus, Thapar and McDermott (2001) 
revealed that recall and recognition of studied items and critical lures decreased over 
time, yet more so for studied items than for critical lures.  In addition, the level of 
processing had a profound effect on recall and recognition at all three time intervals. 
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Fuzzy trace theory would predict these results because although the details have 
been lost due to decay, the gist remained strong enough for recall and recognition.  At 
test, individuals could then rely more on the fuzzy trace than the details or verbatim 
memory.  The source monitoring theory would also predict this result if one assumes that 
participants lower their threshold on which they base their memory judgments.  The 
longer the delay from list presentation to test, the greater the amount of decay.  To 
outweigh the effects of decay, participants make adjustments for the change in activation 
and adopt a lower threshold in order to remember some information about the event.  
This would account for the remembering critical lures, as less emphasis is placed on 
remembering exactly if a word was presented, and more on emotional and cognitive 
features of a word – features the individual associates with the critical lure.  Similarly, the 
criterion shift theory would predict McDermott's (1996) results if one assumes that 
participants lower their criterion in order to remember some information about an event 
that occurred several days earlier.  However, the spreading activation theory has 
difficulty predicting this result because both the words on the lists and the critical lures 
were highly activated during encoding, and there is no a priori reason to expect that one 
should decay more rapidly than the other.   
Repetition 
Recently, McDermott (1996, Experiment 2) examined the extent to which 
multiple presentations of the same lists would have an effect on the number of studied 
items and critical lures recalled.  Using 3 lists from Roediger and McDermott (1995), two 
lists of 45 words were generated that presented the 45 words in two different sequences.  
In one list, the words from the 3 chosen lists were presented one after the other in the 
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order in which Roediger and McDermott (1995) used (blocked order).  In the other list, 
the words from the chosen 3 lists were presented in a completely random order (random 
order).  Participants saw either the blocked or random list five times and were asked to 
recall the words from the list after each presentation.  Participants returned the next day 
to complete a free recall test.   
Results revealed no effect of blocked or random order on recall of studied items 
or critical lures.  However, recall for studied items increased while the number of critical 
lures reported decreased as list presentation increased.  Interestingly, the false memory 
effect was still robust even after 5 list presentations.  After a 24-hour delay, recall for 
studied items decreased while recall of critical lures increased.  These results indicate that 
although repetition reduces the magnitude of the false memory effect, it does not 
eliminate the phenomenon.  Such a finding may be best explained by the fuzzy trace 
theory if one assumes that participants learn to rely on verbatim traces with increasing list 
presentations.  That is, as participants see the same list multiple times, they may learn to 
adopt a verbatim recall strategy and abandon the influence of a gist-based strategy.  
Because false recall of the critical lure is hypothesized to result from the reliance on gist-
based trace, one would expect the pattern obtained by McDermott (1996):  higher rates of 
correct recall of studied words and lower rates of false recall as list repetition increases.  
It is unclear how any of the other theories of false-memory construction (at least as they 
are currently formulated) can account for this result. 
 Explanation 
 Research on perceptual illusions (e.g., the Müller-Lyer illusion) has shown that 
conscious knowledge of the illusion does not diminish the effect (Gregory, 1968).  
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Several researchers (e.g., Gallo et al., 1997; McDermott & Roediger, 1998) have been 
interested in determining if the same phenomenon would hold for false memories.  
McDermott and Roediger (1998) performed three different experiments using the 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm in which participants were informed of the 
false memory effect.  Specifically, participants were told that they would hear lists of 
words to remember, each list containing words associated to one specific word.  Some 
lists would contain that word while others would not, and participants were told that they 
must first figure out the word and then decide if it was presented or not.  Participants 
were then given the word list for 'king' as an example.  Results showed that warning 
participants about the false memory effect lead to a reduction, but not an elimination of 
the false recognition of information. 
 Gallo et al (1997) used a more direct method to study the extent to which warning 
participants about the phenomenon would lead to the elimination of false memories.  
Sixteen lists from the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm were used.  Participants 
were placed in one of three different experimental groups: an uninformed group, in which 
participants were told to try and remember as many words as possible because they 
would be given a recognition test later; a cautious group, in which participants were told 
that some words on recognition test would be new but would be very similar to some 
words that had been presented in the lists; and a forewarned group, in which participants 
were explicitly told about the false memory effect.   
Results revealed that recognition for studied items was highest for the uninformed 
group, whereas the recognition of studied items was equivalent for the cautious and 
forewarned groups.  Perhaps more importantly, the forewarned group falsely recognized 
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fewer critical lures than both uninformed and cautious groups (Gallo et al., 1997), 
although they still falsely recognized over half of all critical lures.  The results from 
McDermott and Roediger (1997) and Gallo et al. (1997) provide converging evidence 
that although the false memory effect is weakened when participants are warned about 
the false memory effect, participants still reliably report recognizing critical lures that 
were not presented on the word lists.  
Fuzzy trace theory would predict this result if one assumes that when individuals 
are warned of the effect, they automatically adopt a verbatim strategy over a gist-based 
strategy for recall/recognition. The source monitoring theory would also predict this 
result if one assumes that when participants are warned, they adopt a higher threshold on 
which they base their memory judgments.  Similarly, the criterion shift theory would 
predict this result if one assumes that participants adopt a higher criterion at 
recall/recognition.  The spreading activation theory, on the other hand, could not predict 
this result. 
The explanation of the false memory phenomenon was also used to directly test if 
the criterion shift account could be used to explain false memories.  Gallo, Roediger, & 
McDermott (2001) wanted to determine if the warning effects could be due to encoding 
processes or decision processes at test (criterion shift) or a combination of both.  
Participants were place in one of four groups.  The control group was instructed to be as 
accurate as possible (no warning condition).  The second group was given the warning 
before the study, replicating the two previous studies mentioned (warning before study).  
The third group was given the warning after the words were presented but before the test 
(warning after study).  These three groups were administered 12 lists from Roediger and 
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McDermott (1995) in which half the lists included the critical lure in the list in an attempt 
to manipulate strategies instead of calculating signal detection estimates of bias.  One 
addition group was included in which the participants were given a warning after 
studying the 12 without any of the critical lures present (warning after study with all 
critical lures).  After the presentation of the lists, all participants were administered the 
same 84-item recognition test and were instructed to make the Remember/Know 
distinction.  All groups were given an example using the list ‘sleep’ which was used to 
explain the false memory phenomenon in the experimental groups. 
Results revealed that the rate of critical lures reported as old was significantly 
higher when the corresponding list had been studied compared to when the list had not 
been studied for the control, warning before study and warning before test groups.  There 
was no significant difference between the rate of critical lures identified as old in the 
warning before study group and warning before test group.  The authors then employed 
several statistical corrections of the recognition data for both studied items and critical 
lures based on procedures by Snodgrass & Corwin (1988) with the purpose of providing 
an index of the influence of list presentation on recognition performance (see Gallo et al, 
2001).  This correction indicated no difference between the control, warning before study 
and warning before test groups in the recognition of studied items and critical items when 
the critical lure was presented.  When the critical lure was not presented in the list, there 
was a significant difference between recognition of studied items and critical lures, such 
that studied items were reported as old at a higher rate.  In addition, there was no 
difference between those three groups in the rate of studied items.  However, the warning 
before study group significantly identified critical lures as old at a lower rate than the 
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control group.  The warning before test did not differ in the rate of false recognition of 
critical lures from the control group.  The manipulation check, the warning before test 
group with all critical lures presented, indicated a response bias, such that they rated both 
critical lures and studied items as new more often than the warning before test group. 
The results from this study indicate that presenting the critical lure in some lists 
but not in others prevents participants from adopting the criterion shift as a strategy, as 
the warning attempts to motivate the participants to use a stringent criterion.  However, 
because the participants still showed a high rate of false recognition of critical lures, it is 
apparent they were unable to do so.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the false memory 
phenomenon is simply due to a criterion shift in strategy.  A theoretical account of the 
limitations of the criterion-shift account of false memory is provided mathematically in 
Wixted & Stretch (2000). 
List Length 
Deese (1959) proposed that false recall and false recognition would be related to 
the mean (average) associative strength of all the words on each list.  The mean or 
average associative strength of a list is calculated by adding the strength of the each 
word’s association to the critical lure and dividing that sum by the number of words on 
the list.  This hypothesis stands in contrast to the hypothesis of Robinson and Roediger 
(1997) in which they argue that false recall and false recognition is related to the total 
associative strength of all the words on the list.  The total associative strength of a list is 
calculated by obtaining a sum of the strength of each word's association to the critical 
lure.   
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Using the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm, Robinson and Roediger 
(1997) examined these two hypotheses by changing the total number of associated items 
in each list (list length).  In their experiment, five different list lengths were presented 
with 3, 6, 9, or 15 words in each list.  In each list, the most highly associated word to the 
critical lure was in the first position and the least associated word was placed in position 
15.  Thus, the different lengths included a different number of the most highly associated 
words to a critical lure in an attempt to manipulate the total associative strength of each 
list.  Results revealed that participants recalled fewer list words but more critical lures as 
list length increased.  Surprisingly, increasing the list length had no effect on correct 
recognition, but did increase the false recognition of critical lures.  On the basis of this 
evidence, Robinson and Roediger (1997) concluded that the magnitude of the false 
memory effect increased with total associative strength.   
In a second experiment, Robinson and Roediger (1997) sought to replicate this 
finding using the same word lists, but they added unrelated words so that each list 
contained 15 words.  If the mean (average) associative strength of the list has an effect on 
false recall and recognition as Deese (1959) proposed, then the results from Experiment 2 
should not replicate those obtained in Experiment 1.  In other words adding non-
associated words to equalize list length would diminish the mean associative strength of 
the lists in Experiment 2.  However, if the total associative strength has an effect on false 
recall and recognition as Robinson and Roediger (1997) suggest, then the results from 
Experiment 2 should replicate those obtained in Experiment 1 because the total 
associative strength is equivalent between the lists in the two experiments.   Results from 
Experiment 2 replicated those obtained in Experiment 1, confirming Robinson and 
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Roediger's (1997) hypothesis that it is the total associative strength of the words in the list 
that influences false recall and recognition.  
The results obtained from Robinson and Roediger (1997) can be readily explained 
by the implicit and spreading activation theories.  With respect to the implicit activation 
theory, as the number of associated words in the list increases, the number of times the 
critical lure is activated should also increase.  The more the critical lure is activated by 
associated words, the more likely it is that a participant will implicitly activate the critical 
lure.  This activation should not depend on how many words are on a list, but only on 
how many words on the list are associated with the critical lure. The same logic may be 
applied to show how the semantic activation theory could predict this result.  The source 
monitoring theory fuzzy trace theory, and the criterion shift theory, as currently proposed, 
do not make clear predictions about the mean associative versus total associative strength 
issue. 
Encoding and Retrieval 
Attempts have been made to study the effect of manipulating the encoding and 
retrieval of the words on each list.  In Experiment 2, Read (1996) placed participants in 
three conditions: a serial-learning group, in which participants were told to learn the 
words in the order in which they are presented; an elaborative-rehearsal group, in which 
participants were instructed to think about and rehearse the words in order to answer 
questions about word meanings later; and a maintenance-rehearsal group, in which 
participants were told only to remember the last word of each list.  At recall, participants 
were told either to write down as many words as they could in free-recall format or to 
recall the words in the order in which they appeared.  Results showed that the 
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elaborative-rehearsal group recalled more list words than the maintenance-rehearsal 
group who, in turn, recalled more list words than serial-learning group.  With regard to 
critical lures, the serial-learning group recalled significantly fewer critical lures than the 
elaborative- and maintenance-rehearsal groups, who did not differ from each other with 
respect to the number of critical lures recalled.   
The results obtained by Read (1996) are difficult to explain by any of the 
proposed theories of false-memory construction.  Perhaps the best explanation can be 
offered by the fuzzy trace theory.  The serial learning group presumably processed the 
words in the lists most deeply (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), and relied more on verbatim 
than gist traces which would explain why they recalled fewer critical lures than the 
elaborative- and maintenance-rehearsal groups.  Because the latter two groups were not 
required to remember the words in order, they could rely on both verbatim and gist traces 
which would increase the probability that they would recall more critical lures.  In 
contrast, the spreading activation theory, the implicit activation theory, the source 
monitoring theory and the criterion shift theory do not easily explain the results obtained 
by Read (1996). 
 Social Factors 
 Recently, there has been some work examining the effects of social factors on 
false memories.  Roediger, Meade and Bergman (2001) combined two famous paradigms 
in studying memory: Asch’s (1952) paradigm to study social conformity and Loftus’ 
(1993) paradigm studying eyewitness testimony.  Six slides consisting of common 
household items were developed for this experiment with each slide containing items that 
participants in a pilot study indicated they would expect to see.  Items were classified as 
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either high- or low-expectancy items based upon the number of participants indicated 
they expected to see that item.  Four items were excluded from each slide, 2 low- and 2 
high-expectancy items, to be used later in the experiment.  Participants were 
accompanied by a confederate.  The participant and the confederate were shown the 6 
slides for either 15 seconds or 60 seconds.  After all 6 slides had been presented, 
multiplication problems were administered for 4 minutes.  The participant and the 
confederate were then asked to work together on a free recall test in which they took 
turns saying one item they remembered for a total of 12 items for each of the 6 slides.  
The confederate was instructed on 3 of the slides to produce one high- and one low-
expectancy (contagion) item that had been omitted in the slides.  The participant was then 
taken into a separate room and completed a free recall test for each scene with additional 
instructions to indicate if they remembered the item or if they knew the item had been 
seen. 
 The results indicated that the participants falsely recalled the contagion items 
suggested by the confederate at a higher rate than the contagion items not suggested by 
the confederate.  Participants were also more likely to recall high-expectancy items than 
low-expectancy items.  In addition, participants who were only allowed to view the 
scenes for 15 sec were more likely to include the suggested items than participants who 
were allowed to view the scenes for 60 sec.  The remember/know responses indicated 
that the contagion items which were falsely recalled were more likely to be judged as 
known than remember.   
 The source monitoring theory provides the best account for the results.  
According to the source monitoring theory, the collaborative recall test is a source of 
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retroactive interference whereby the participants later retrieve the erroneous information 
presented during the collaborative recall, but attribute it to the presented scene rather than 
the confederate.  Therefore, the participant would falsely recall items recalled by the 
confederate.   In addition, the know judgments indicate that although the item is 
attributed to the scene, the exact source is unavailable to the participant.   
 The spreading activation theory and the fuzzy trace theory would also be able to 
explain the results, although on a much more basic level.  The spreading activation theory 
would propose that the items the confederate suggested during recall had already been 
activated by the presentation of the scene, and were pushed beyond threshold by the 
confederate’s mention of the items.  The participant would recall the items as if they had 
actually been presented during the slides, but the actual memory would be unavailable 
and those items would be judged as known.  The explanation through the fuzzy-trace 
theory is similar, only the participants do not rely on activation of the nodes, they rely on 
fuzzy-traces, some of which would lead to those items mentioned by the confederate.  
 Development 
 There have been several studies that have examined false memories in children 
and older adults.  In Underwood's (1975) terms, the examination of age-related 
differences may serve as a ‘crucible’ for evaluating more general theories of cognitive 
function.   
 A multitude of studies have examined adult age differences in younger and older 
adult’s susceptibility to false memories (e.g., Norman & Schacter, 1997; Tun, Wingfield, 
Rosen, 1995; Tun, Wingfield, Blanchard, Rosen, 1996).  In one experiment, Norman and 
Schacter (1997) tested both young and older adults using the Roediger and McDermott 
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(1995) paradigm.  In addition, they modified the recognition test such that on items that 
were recognized as old, participants were not only asked to make remember and know 
judgments, but they were also asked to explain why they made the judgments that they 
did (e.g. I reported that “needle” was old because it was in the same list as thread).   
 Older adults recalled fewer studied items, more critical lures, and more intrusions 
(novel items) than younger adults.  On the recognition test, older adults recognized fewer 
studied items, more critical lures, and falsely identified more new items as having been 
on the list as compared to young adults.   Although more ‘know’ responses were 
generated for critical lures when both young and old participants were required to explain 
their responses, participants still falsely recognized critical lures.  Together, these 
findings indicate that there are developmental differences in false-memory construction 
favoring young adults, and that even careful consideration of critical lures did not 
diminish the false memory phenomenon. 
 Analysis of the reasons why participants reported some words as old revealed that 
the information about the semantic relationships between words on the list was important 
for both studied items and critical lures, regardless of the age of the participant.  Young 
and old participants also reported that the reaction(s) that they had to a word presented on 
the list helped them to identify words on the recognition test as old (e.g. I remember the 
word arachnid because of the fear I have of spiders).  This indicates that both younger 
and older adults’ explanations were primarily associative in nature. 
The results obtained by Norman and Schacter (1997) may best be accounted for 
by the fuzzy trace theory of memory.  Because older adults have poorer memory abilities, 
they are likely to rely more on the fuzzy trace information rather than the verbatim 
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information, making them more susceptible to false-memory construction than young 
adults, who have more verbatim information available to them.  However, the criterion 
shift and spreading activation theories could also explain the difference between younger 
and older adults if one assumes that older adults adopt a more lenient criterion (or lower 
threshold) when making judgments on items because of reductions in their memory 
ability. 
Recall Confidence 
Researchers in false-memory construction have been interested in the confidence 
with which participants recall information from words on lists that were presented to 
them.  It may be that participants recall or recognize critical lures in an experimental 
setting, but are not very confident that they heard or saw those words on the studied lists.  
To investigate this possibility, Read (1996, Experiment 1) conducted an experiment using 
the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm in which participants were required to 
give a confidence rating for each word that they reported during a recall test.  Participants 
were to assign a confidence rating from 1 (no confidence) to 5 (extremely confident) as a 
testament to how confident they were that word was presented.  Results revealed that 
when participants reported the critical lure early in recall, it received a similar confidence 
rating as those given for studied items.  However, when participants reported the critical 
lure late in recall, it received a lower confidence rating as those given for studied items.  
This finding suggested that participants’ subjective confidence in information recalled 
from memory is not necessarily correlated with the accuracy of that information (Read, 
1996). 
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A study by Brédart (1999) employed the confidence intervals used by Read for 
the recall phase, and additionally examined why some participants did not recall the 
critical lure.  The author proposed two hypotheses: the critical lure was not thought of at 
all, or else it was thought of, but the participants determined that the word had not been 
presented, and therefore did not write it down.  Eight lists of ten items were constructed 
based on two pilot studies that determined degree of association for those lists and their 
ability to generate a mental image of the person/character associated with the lists.  Each 
list was read out to the participants, and then followed by recall for 90 sec (Phase I).  In 
Phase II, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 5 how confident they were, 
that each word they recalled had been read aloud by the examiner.  In addition, in Phase 
III participants were presented with the words they recalled for each list separately, and 
were asked if there were any words they had thought of for that list either during the 
presentation or recall, but had not written down because they thought it had not been read 
aloud.  Participants were then asked to rate their confidence on a scale from 1 to 5 how 
sure they were, that the word had not been presented to them. 
The results indicated that there was no difference in the amount of critical lures 
recalled in Phase I and Phase III.  However, in Phase III, a comparison between 
participants who recalled critical lures in Phase III and participants who did not recall the 
critical lure during Phase III were compared for each list.  The results from this analysis 
revealed that for each list, more participants recalled the critical lure at a significantly 
higher rate than not.  The author concluded that this was evidence that participants did 
not include the critical lure during Phase I recall because, although they thought of the 
critical lure, they were able to determine that it had not been presented.   
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This is an example of successful source monitoring.  The critical lure was 
activated at or above threshold, according to the spreading activation theory and the 
implicit activation theory, because the critical lure was recalled during Phase III, but 
neither the spreading activation theory nor the implicit activation theory would be able to 
explain why the critical lure was not recalled during Phase I.  On the other hand, the 
fuzzy-trace theory would be able to explain the results, as the participants were basing 
their judgments more on verbatim traces than fuzzy traces in Phase I, but were asked to 
utilize fuzzy traces in Phase III, thereby producing the critical lure. 
Metamemory 
In contrast to research that has examined participant's confidence in their recall of 
words presented on lists, it is possible that one's overall confidence in one's memory, or 
metamemory, might affect false-memory construction.  Several studies have shown that 
memory confidence is positively related to recall and recognition performance (e.g., 
Dixon & Hultsch, 1983b, Williams, Denney & Schadler, 1983).  In other words, 
participants who believe that they have good memory abilities also tend to show higher 
levels of performance on recall and recognition tests than participants who believe that 
they have poor memory abilities.  If memory confidence affects recall and recognition 
performance, then it stands to reason that memory confidence might also affect false-
memory construction, although the direction of this relationship is unclear.   
Memory Confidence and Eyewitness Testimony 
One of the factors in eyewitness testimony that jurors rely heavily upon is the 
confidence of the eyewitness in their ability.  Common sense would identify an 
eyewitness’s confidence in their ability to identify the criminal would help indicate how 
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accurate an eyewitness is.  In fact, the court case Neil vs. Biggers (1972) identified 
confidence as an index of reliability and accuracy of the eyewitness.  Wells, Lindsay and 
Ferguson (1979) were able to establish that not only judges, but also juries, place 
importance on the confidence of the eyewitness.  Migueles and Garcia-Bajos (1999) 
investigated confidence in free recall and recognition tests in eyewitness testimony under 
certain conditions.  Participants viewed three video segments: the first segment contained 
news about drugs, the second was an emotional scene of a kidnapping attempt, and the 
third contained commercials.  One group of participants (incidental group) was told they 
would be asked to judge the length of each of the segments while the other group 
(intentional group) was told they were told to pay close attention as they would be asked 
to make evaluations about the segments later.  Participants were given five minutes after 
viewing the segments to recall what took place in the kidnapping scene, and were then 
given a recognition test on which they evaluated sentences by determining if each 
sentence was true of false, and their confidence of their decisions.  The results concerning 
their confidence ratings revealed that confidence ratings were higher when participants 
correctly identified a statement was true than when they incorrectly identified the 
statement was true, which in turn was higher then the ratings on correct rejections and 
incorrect rejections.  Participants also had higher confidence scores with questions 
concerning central information than peripheral information, and higher confidence scores 
on action questions than details.  In conclusion, confidence scores depended on the type 
and content of the information as well as the accuracy. 
Recently, Schneider, Jenkins, and Ciampi (unpublished data examined the extent 
to which memory confidence influenced recall, recognition, and false memory 
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performance using the Roediger’ and McDermott (1995) paradigm by manipulating 
participant's confidence in their memory abilities experimentally.  Specifically, 
participants were given false feedback about their performance on a memory game 
(concentration).  Some participants were told they had performed poorly on the memory 
game (low-confidence group), others were told that they had performed extremely well 
on the memory game (high-confidence group), and the remaining participants were given 
no feedback about their performance (neutral group).  After the instructional 
manipulation was administered, the Roediger and McDermott (1995) false memory 
paradigm was administered to all participants.  
 Results failed to reveal a significant condition effect recall or recognition of 
critical lures.  However, there was a trend in the recall data for studied words, such that 
the high-confidence group recalled studied words at a rate of .57, the control group 
recalled studied words at a rate of .55, and the low-confidence group recalled words at a 
rate of .52.  These findings suggest the possibility that the confidence manipulation was 
not strong enough to influence recall or recognition performance. 
Present Study 
 Although no effect of memory confidence was obtained in the Schneider et al. 
study, two mitigating factors need to be considered before one can conclude that 
metamemory does not affect false-memory construction.  First, Schneider et al. used a 
between subjects design to investigate their hypothesis; an experimental design that is 
considerably weaker than a within subjects design.  Second, the lack of an effect of 
metamemory on the recall and recognition of studied items and critical lures may have 
resulted from an unsuccessful or weak confidence manipulation.  
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In light of these limitations, the goal of the proposed study was to further 
investigate the effects of metamemory on false-memory construction.  This research 
improves on Schneider et al. by manipulating memory confidence within-subjects.  
Additionally, the present study used performance on three memory tests in an attempt to 
increase the strength of the metamemory manipulation.  Initially, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups: high confidence, low confidence, or neutral.  
Participants in the high-confidence group received positive, negative, and then positive 
feedback about their memory performance on three different memory tests.  Participants 
in the low-confidence group received negative, positive, and then negative feedback 
about their memory performance on the same three memory tests.  Finally, participants in 
the neutral group received neutral feedback about their memory performance on all three 
memory tests. 
Using the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm, participants were 
administered a total of 32 word lists taken from Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott 
(1999), and a recall test was administered after each list was presented.  Word lists were 
divided into 4 separate blocks of 8 lists.  After each block of lists, participants took one of 
the three memory tests.  Participants in each group received the appropriate feedback 
about their performance in order to manipulate metamemory in the desired direction 
(positive, negative, or neutral).  After all 32 lists were presented, participants completed a 
recognition test in which they were asked to identify the words presented on each list and 
to make remember, know (Tulving, 1985), and guess judgments (Gardiner & Conway, 
1999) 
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1   
As in previous research (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995), participants will 
show higher rates of correct recall for studied items as compared to critical lures.  In 
addition, participants will show higher rates of false recall of critical lures than non-
studied intrusions.   
Hypothesis 2 
If memory confidence affects recall, then the recall rate of studied items will 
change  after each manipulation for both the high and low confidence groups.  That is, the 
high confidence group will recall more studied items from lists 9-16 and 25-32 than from 
the lists 1-8 and 17-24, and will recall fewer studied items from lists 17-24 than any other 
list.  The low confidence group will recall more studied items on lists 17-24 and than any 
other list.  The low confidence group will also recall fewer studied items on lists 9-16 and 
25-32 than from lists 1-8 and 17-24.  The neutral group will not change in the amount of 
studied items recalled on any of the lists.  These predictions are displayed in the three 
panels of Figure 2.  
If memory confidence affects recall, then it is anticipated that memory confidence 
will also have an effect on the recall of critical lures.  However, because of the 
exploratory nature of the proposed study and because no one theory of false memory 
construction can account for all the results obtained in previous research, no formal 
predictions about the nature of this relationship are offered.  
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Figure 2.  Hypothesized results for the recall of studied items for the high-confidence 
group (top), the low-confidence group (middle), and the neutral group (bottom). 
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Hypothesis 3 
As in previous research (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995), participants will 
show higher rates of correct recognition for studied items as compared to critical lures.  
In addition, participants will show higher rates of false recognition of critical lures than 
non-studied items.   
Hypothesis 4 
If memory confidence affects recognition, then the recognition of studied items 
and critical lures will change after each manipulation for both the high and low 
confidence groups.  The high confidence group will recognize more studied items from 
lists 9-16 and 25-32 than from the lists 1-8 and 17-24, and will recognize fewer studied 
items from lists 17-24 than any other list.  The low confidence will recognize more 
studied items from lists 17-24 and than any other list.  The low confidence group will 
also recognize fewer studied items from lists 9-16 and 25-32 than from lists 1-8 and 17-
24.  The neutral group will not change in the amount of studied items recognized on any 
of the lists.  These predictions are displayed in the three panels of Figure 3.  
If memory confidence affects recognition, then it is anticipated that memory 
confidence will also have an effect on the recognition of critical lures.  However, because 
of the exploratory nature of the proposed study and because no one theory of false 
memory construction can account for all the results obtained in previous research, no 
formal predictions about the nature of this relationship are offered.   
 
47 
High Confidence Condition
Lists
Lists 1-8 Lists 9-16 Lists 17-24 Lists 25-32
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
of
 S
tu
di
ed
 It
em
s
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Low Confidence Condition
Lists
Lists 1-8 Lists 9-16 Lists 17-24 Lists 25-32
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
of
 S
tu
di
ed
 It
em
s
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Neutral Confidence Condition
Lists
Lists 1-8 Lists 9-16 Lists 17-24 Lists 25-32
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
of
 S
tu
di
ed
 It
em
s
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
 
Figure 3.  Hypothesized results for the recognition of studied items for the high-
confidence group (top panel), the low-confidence group (middle panel) and neutral group 
(bottom panel). 
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Hypothesis 5   
Consistent with results obtained by Roediger and McDermott (1995), participants 
will make more remember judgment on studied items recognized as old, than critical 
lures recognized as old.  In addition, more know responses will be made on critical lures 
identified as old than studied items recognized as old.  It is possible that the generation of 
high memory confidence may result in participants making more remember than know 
responses whereas the generation of low confidence may result in participants making 
more know than remember responses, although these predictions are purely speculative in 
nature. 
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METHODS 
Participants  
Forty-three females and 17 males aged 18-25 (M = 19.08, SD = 2.06) 
participated, yielding an overall sample of N=60 participants.  Participants were 
recruited from the University of North Carolina Department of Psychology 
undergraduate General Psychology volunteer subject pool.  Each participant was 
screened using a detailed self-report health questionnaire (see Appendix A) and 
participants were excluded if they reported a history of alcohol or drug abuse, 
drug/alcohol addiction, hospitalization within the last year for a serious medical 
illness, specific visual problems (e.g., color blindness), medical problems (e.g., 
diabetes), neurological problems (e.g., traumatic head injury) or psychiatric illnesses 
(e.g., current or chronic depression).  Information on the use of over-the-counter and 
prescription medications was obtained and participants included in the study were not 
taking any medications known to affect general arousal, motivation, memory, or 
learning.  
Analyses were performed on the age, sex and education of the participants to 
determine whether there were significant differences between the confidence groups.  
There were  significantly more females than males in the neutral confidence condition, 
χ²(1, N = 20) = 7.2, p < .05 than in the high and low confidence conditions, but no 
gender imbalances were observed between the high and low confidence conditions.  
As there is no literature to suggest gender differences in recall or recognition 
performance on studied items or critical lures, the finding of a gender difference 
between the groups is not expected to systematically alter the results of this study.  
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One-way ANOVAs were performed on the age and education of the participants.  
Results revealed there no differences in the ages (F = .23, MSE = 4.36) or years of 
education (F = .30, MSE = 1.5) of the participants in the different conditions (ps > 
.05).   
A 8 (Lists: 1-8) x 3 (Condition: High, Low, Neutral) ANOVA was performed 
on the recall of the first 8 lists was performed to examine whether there were any 
overall differences memory performance on recall between the conditions.  The 
ANOVA revealed no significant main effects (p < .001), or interactions (p > .05).   
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Groups  
 Overall High Low Neutral 
Age 19.08 (2.06) 18.85 
(1.46) 
19.1 
(1.74) 
19.3 
(2.81) 
Education 12.63 (1.21) 12.78 
(1.30) 
12.48 
(.99) 
12.65 
(1.35) 
 
Table 1.  Means (Standard Errors) of Age and Education by Group  
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 Materials 
 Health Questionnaire 
 The self-report health questionnaire (Appendix A) was designed to assess current 
sensory motor functioning, prior history of medical illness or disease, and prior history of 
possible psychiatric illness (Jenkins, Myerson, Joerding, & Hale, 2000).  The health 
questionnaire was administered for two purposes.  First, responses to the health 
questionnaire were used for screening purposes to ensure that a healthy, homogenous 
sample was obtained.  Second, responses on the health questionnaire were used to assess 
the existence of baseline differences in motor, visual, or psychological function between 
individuals assigned to the high, low, and neutral-confidence groups.  
Pre-Test Memory Questionnaire 
 This questionnaire (Appendix B) consisted of 3 questions designed to assess 
participant's perceptions of their own memory abilities.  The primary purpose of this 
questionnaire was to evaluate the efficacy of the confidence manipulation at the end of 
the study.   
 Word Lists 
 A total of 48 words lists (Appendix C) were used in the present study:  36 word lists  
taken from Stadler et al. (1999) and 16 lists were constructed using the same norms 
Stadler et al (1999) used from Russell and Jenkins (1954).  Each list consisted of 15 
words highly related to one non-presented word (critical lure).  Only 32 lists were 
presented to the participants, and the remainder was used for the recognition test.  The 
presentation of the words in each list was randomized, but all participants received the 
same random ordering of words in each list.  The number of words correctly recalled, the 
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number of critical lures recalled, and the number of intrusions (i.e., words recalled that 
are not on the word lists or are critical lures) were measured.  The mean associate 
strength of each list based upon Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) was 
included in Appendix C if the information was available for that list.  
 Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test (Rey, 1944)  
 This test (Appendix D) was used to assess the visual-memory ability of the 
participants as well as provide the basis of the first memory manipulation.  The Rey-
Osterrieth Complex Figure test was comprised of 18 interconnected elements (lines, 
squares, and circles).  The figure was given to the participants to study for a total of 2 
minutes and then taken away.  The participant was given a blank piece of paper and told 
to reconstruct the figure as they remember it.  Participants were given 5 minutes to 
complete their drawing.  This test was scored using Loring, Martin, Meador, and Lee’s 
(1990) scoring system.  They developed a scoring system that placed more emphasis on 
memory rather than constructional elements.  Each of the 18 elements was scored 
between .5-2.0 depending accuracy, distortion, and location.  Two points were awarded if 
the participant correctly replicated the element and placed in the proper position.  One 
point was awarded if the element was correct, but not placed properly.  If the element 
drawn was distorted and placed poorly, one-half point was awarded.  The highest score 
possible was 26. 
 Intense Concentration 
 This test was a version of the childhood memory game, “Concentration” that was 
computerized by Michael Hawden for use in the Schneider, Jenkins and Ciampi 
(unpublished data) study and the present experiment.  In this test, the computer presented 
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a display of sixteen blank cards (1.5 in x 1.5 in) that were arranged in a square with 4 
rows and 4 columns.  Participants were instructed to use a mouse to click on any card in 
the matrix to reveal a picture that appears on the other side.  Participants were told that 
there are eight unique pictures and that their job was to find the match for the picture on 
each card as quickly as possible.  Participants were also told that they may only turn over 
two cards at a time.  In a given turn, if the two pictures that they turn over were identical, 
then both pictures will remain revealed.  However, if the two pictures did not match, then 
the pictures disappeared and both cards appeared blank again.  The game was completed 
when all squares were revealed.  There was no time limit to complete this task, although 
scores were computed by the game for both the time it took the participant to win the 
game, and the number of times the participant had to click on the squares before 
completing the game.  The pictures used in this game consist of light purple donut- and 
bubble-like shapes that were presented on a dark purple background.  The pictures were 
randomly chosen from the set of BubbleMania Soft 2C fills in Corel Draw 9.    
WAIS-R Digit Span (Wechsler, 1981) 
In this test (Appendix E), participants were read a series of numbers one at a time 
with a one second break between each presentation.  In the forward digit span task, 
participants were to report the numbers in each series in the order that they were 
presented.  For example, if the experimenter said "6, 8, 1", the participant was to say "6, 
8, 1".  In the backward digit span task, participants were to report the numbers in each 
series backward.  For example, if the experimenter said "6, 8, 1", the participant is to say 
"1, 8, 6".  In both tasks, participants were exposed to two sets of series at an initial length 
of 2 items.  If at least one of the series was recalled correctly, the length of the series was 
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increased by one. The experimenter discontinued testing when the participant failed to 
correctly recall two series of the same length.  Forward and backward memory spans 
were calculated separately.  One point was given for every correctly recalled series length 
and an individual's memory span in each task was the sum total of all series correctly 
recalled.  No penalty was given for errors and no time limit was placed on this task. 
Digit Symbol Substitution Test (Wechsler, 1981) 
This test (Appendix F) was designed to examine processing speed and working 
memory ability.  At the top of the test, a key was presented in which the numbers 1- 9 are 
each associated with one symbol that appears in a box below each number.  At the 
bottom of the page, seven rows of 20 numbers (ranging from 1-9) were presented with a 
blank box beneath each number. Participants were told to place the corresponding symbol 
beneath each number in the box provided, starting at the top left hand corner and 
proceeding across to right.  Seven sample items were given, after which the participant 
had 60 seconds to complete as many of the boxes that they could.  Participants were 
awarded one point for every correct symbol, and no penalties were given for incorrect or 
absent symbols.  A total of 133 points could be obtained on this test. 
 Recognition Test 
 In this test (Appendix G), words that were presented in positions 1, 8 and 10 and all 
32 critical lures from the word lists were presented.  In addition, words in position 1, 8, 
and 10 and the critical lure from the 16 word lists not presented were also included on the 
recognition test as novel words.  In sum, there were 192 words on the recognition test (96 
studied list items, 32 critical lures, and 64 non-studied or novel words).  The presentation 
of words on the recognition test was randomized with the constraint that no words or 
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critical lures from the same list were presented consecutively.  All participants were 
administered the same randomized order of words on the recognition test. 
 Participants were to indicate whether they recognize the word as one that they studied 
by circling “old” or as one that is novel by circling “new.”  When a word on the 
recognition test was identified a studied item, participants were also to indicate whether 
they specifically remembered the word being presented (remember) by writing ‘R’ on the 
line provided, simply know that the word was presented (know) by writing ‘K’ on the 
line provided, or guessed that the word was on a list (guess) by writing ‘G’ on the line 
provided.  Remember and know judgments were included in order to determine if 
participants who recognized critical lures as being presented actually report remembering 
the item or not.  Guess judgments were also included for those instances when the 
participant could not remember the item as having been presented and has no feelings of 
knowing that the item has been presented, thereby increasing construct validity (Gallo, 
McDermott et al, 2001) 
 The number of studied words correctly recognized as old (i.e., hits) and the number of 
novel words correctly identified as new (i.e., correct rejections) were measured.  In 
addition, the number of critical lures identified as old and the number of novel words 
incorrectly identified as old (i.e., false alarms) were measured.  Finally, the number of 
studied words identified as new (i.e., misses) was measured. 
 Post-Test Memory Questionnaire 
 This questionnaire (Appendix H) consisted of 4 questions designed to assess 
participant's perceptions of their own memory abilities.  The data obtained from this 
questionnaire was compared to the data collected from the pre-test memory questionnaire 
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in order to assess the global effects of the memory confidence manipulation on 
metamemory.   
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room and each testing 
session lasted approximately 1.5 - 2 hours.  Participants were exposed to 11 tasks 
presented in the following order:  pre-testing memory questionnaire, false memory lists 
1-8 (including recall tests), Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure test, false memory lists 9-16 
(including recall tests), Intense Concentration, false memory lists 17-24 (including recall 
tests), WAIS-R Digit Span Subtest, false memory lists 25-32 (including recall tests), 
WAIS-R Digit Symbol Substitution Test, the false memory recognition test, and the post-
testing memory questionnaire.  
Initially, participants were administered the health questionnaire and the pre-
testing memory questionnaire.  Both questionnaires were self-paced.  After completing 
the pre-testing memory questionnaire, participants were administered the first false 
memory task (lists 1-8).  Participants were told that they would see a series of words on 
the computer screen presented one at a time.  Each word was presented on the screen for 
1 s with a blank screen appearing for 500 ms before the appearance of the next word.  
After each word list was presented, a recall test was administered.  Specifically, 
participants were given a blank piece of paper and told they had 2 min during which time 
they were to write down as many words from the list they just saw that they could 
remember.  After the recall test for the eighth word list was completed, participants were 
given the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure test.   
 
58 
Upon completion of the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure test, all participants were 
told that this task taps memory abilities similar to those that they use when trying to find 
their car in a crowded parking lot (e.g., the mall).  Participants were then quasi-randomly 
assigned to one of three groups (i.e., high confidence, low confidence, or neutral) with 
the constraint that there were equal numbers of participants assigned to each group.  
Participants in the low-confidence group were told that their memory performance on the 
Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure test was below average.  Further, they were asked if they 
have trouble finding their car in a crowded parking lot, and more generally, if they 
thought that their overall memory abilities were poor.  Participants in the high-confidence 
group were told that their memory performance on the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure 
test was above average, suggesting that their overall memory abilities were exceptional.  
Finally, participants in the neutral group were told that their memory performance on the 
Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure test was average, suggesting that their overall memory 
abilities was average.   
Participants were then administered false memory lists 9-16.  After completing 
the recall test from the sixteenth list, participants were administered the Intense 
Concentration Memory test.  Participants were told that this task taps memory abilities 
similar to those that they use when trying to remember the name of an acquaintance or 
someone they just met. 
Upon completion of the Intense Concentration Memory test, participants were 
given feedback about their performance on this test.  Specifically, participants who were 
assigned to the low-confidence group were told that their memory performance on the 
Intense Concentration Memory test was above average, suggesting that, in contrast with 
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the previous memory test, their overall memory abilities were excellent.  Participants in 
the high-confidence group were told that their memory performance on this test was 
below average, suggesting that, in contrast with the previous memory test, their overall 
memory abilities were poor.  Finally, participants in the neutral group were told that their 
memory performance on the test was average, suggesting that, consistent with the 
previous memory test, their overall memory abilities were average.   
Participants were then administered false memory lists 17-24.  After completing 
the recall test from the twenty-fourth list, participants were administered the WAIS-R 
Digit Span Subtest (Appendix E).  Participants were told that this task taps memory 
abilities similar to those that they use when trying to hold a phone number in memory 
until they reach the phone. 
Upon completion of the WAIS-R Digit Span Subtest, participants were given 
feedback about their performance on this test.  Specifically, participants who were 
assigned to the low-confidence group were told that their memory performance on the 
WAIS-R Digit Span Subtest was below average, suggesting that, in contrast with the 
previous memory test, their overall memory abilities were poor.  Participants in the high-
confidence group were told that their memory performance on this test was above 
average, suggesting that, in contrast with the previous memory test, their overall memory 
abilities were excellent.  Finally, participants in the neutral group were be told that their 
memory performance on the test was average, suggesting that, consistent with the 
previous memory test, their overall memory abilities were average.   
Participants were then administered false memory lists 25-32.  After the recall test 
from the thirty-second list was completed, participants were administered the WAIS-R 
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Digit-Symbol Substitution test (Appendix F).  Immediately following the completion of 
the Digit-Symbol test, the recognition test was administered.  Participants were asked to 
distinguish whether each word on the recognition test (Appendix G) was presented in any 
of the 32 lists (old) or if the word was novel (new).  For each item judged to be old, 
participants were also be asked to report whether they remember the word (R), simply 
know that the word was presented in one of the lists (K), or if they guessed that the word 
was old (G).  They were told to make a distinction for each item they recognize as old if 
they "remember its occurrence in the lists or whether they simply knew on some other 
basis that the item was a member of the study lists" (Tulving, 1985, p. 8) or if they just 
‘guess’ the item had been presented to them.  The participant was allowed to complete 
the recognition test at their own pace. 
After participants completed the recognition test, they were administered the post-
test memory questionnaire (Appendix H).  This questionnaire was self-paced.  Once the 
questionnaire was completed, the experimenter partially debriefed the participant as to 
the aims of this study and any questions were answered.  Participants were only told 
about the false memory effect in order to minimize the possibility of the study being 
compromised.  At the completion of the study, a letter was sent home to all participants 
explaining the true nature of the experiment. 
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RESULTS 
 All statistical tests were performed on PC SAS version 8.0.  All graphical 
representations of data were generated using Sigma Plot version 8.0.  For all statistical 
comparisons, the type III sums of squares were generated and the Bonferroni correction 
was applied in a groupwise manner to control the rate of false positive conclusions (type I 
error). 
Recall 
Words recalled by participants were categorized as studied items, critical lures, or 
non-critical intrusions.  The number of studied items recalled in list 1 through list 8 were 
calculated and then analyzed in a 2 (List: 1-8) x 3 (Condition: Low, High, Neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVA to determine if there were any recall differences between the 
groups.  No main effect of group was observed (p > 0.05), suggesting that the recall 
performance of the 3 groups was similar on the first 8 lists.  
Probabilities of recall of the total number of studied items and non-critical 
intrusions were calculated across each list within a set, and then divided by 120 (the sum 
of words presented in each set).  Critical lures were calculated in the same manner, 
except the sum was divided by 18.  A 3 (Item: Studied, Critical Lure, Non-Critical 
Intrusion) x 4 (List: 1-8, 9-16, 17-024, 24-32) x 3 (Condition: High, Low, Neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed.  As predicted, a main effect of item, F (2, 
114) = 415.46, p < .0001, MSE = 0.045, was observed.  Planned comparisons revealed a 
higher probability of correct recall for studied items (M = .59, SD = .08) as compared to 
critical lures, (M = .37, SD = .16), F (1, 59) = 82.11, p < .0001, MSE = 0.04.  In addition, 
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the probability of false recall of critical lures was higher than the probability of non-
critical intrusions (M = .03, SD = .02), F (1, 59) = 297.13, p < .0001, MSE = 0.02.   
The recall probabilities are displayed in Figure 4 by item and condition. 
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Figure 4.  Probabilities of Studied Items, Critical Lures, and Non-Critical Items.  
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Recognition 
Words recognized by participants were categorized as either studied items, critical 
lures, or non-studied items.  The probability of recognition was calculated for all 
categories for all participants.  Studied items were calculated first for each separate set of 
lists, and divided by 24 (the sum of studied items presented in each set).  Critical lures 
were calculated in the same manner, only divided by 8.  Non-presented items were 
calculated for the whole recognition test and divided by 64.  A 2 (Item1: studied, critical 
lure) x 4 (List: 1-8, 9-16, 17-24, 24-32) x 3 (Condition: High, Low, Neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed and the proportions are presented in Table 2.  The 
proportion of new items was excluded from analyses that included list as a factor because 
the new items could not be divided according to list presentation.  As predicted, a main 
effect of item, F (1, 57) = 19.91, p < .0001, MSE = .08, as well as a main effect of list, F 
(3, 171) = 9.39, p < .001, MSE = .02, were found.  The item by list interaction was also 
significant, F (3,171) = 9.35, p < .0001, MSE = .01.   
Participants showed higher rates of correct recognition for studied items (M = .75, 
SD = .10) than rates of false recognition to critical lures (M = .37, SD = .19), F (1, 59) = 
19.72, p < .0001, MSE = 0.042.  In comparison, participants showed higher rates of false 
recognition of critical lures (M = .62, SD = .19) than non-studied items (M = .12, SD = 
.06), F (1, 59) = 475.14, p < .0001, MSE = 0.029.   
Participants also showed higher rates of recognition of lists 1-8 (M = .70, SD = 
.16) than lists 9-16 (M = .63, SD = .13), F (1, 59) = 1638, p < .0001, MSE = 0.064, lower 
rates of recognition on lists 9-16 than lists 17-24 (M = .72, SD = .14), F (1, 59) = 94.65, p 
                                                 
1 New items were excluded from this analysis because they could not be divided into to list presentation 
groups.   
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< .0001, MSE = 0.057, and higher rates of recognition on lists 17-24 than on lists 25-32 
(M = .68, SD = .15), F (1, 59) = 1805.51, p < .0001, MSE = 0.065.  Further analyses 
indicated that lists 1-8 showed lower recognition than lists 17-24, F (1, 59) = 1740.81, p 
< .0001, MSE = 0.069.  Participants also showed lower recognition on lists 9-16 than lists 
25-32, F (1, 59) = 1698.44, p < .0001, MSE = 0.06. 
The item by list interaction indicated that recognition of studied items changed 
between the lists.  Participants recognized studied items at a lower rate on lists 1-8 (M = 
.71, SD = .13) than lists 9-16 (M = .72, SD = .13), F (1, 58) = 2304.80, p < .0001, MSE = 
0.05.  Participants recognized studied items at a lower rate on lists 9-16 than lists 17-24 
(M = .80, SD = .12), F (1, 58) = 1679.18, p < .0001, MSE = 0.05.  Participants 
recognized studied items at a higher rate on lists 17-24 than lists 25-32 (M = .72, SD = 
.13), F (1, 58) = 2789.59, p < .0001, MSE = 0.05.  Further, participant recognized studied 
items at a lower rate on lists 1-8 than lists 17-24, F (1, 58) = 2725.19, p < .0001, MSE = 
0.05.  Participants also recognized studied items at a lower rate on listss9-16 than lists 17-
24, F (1, 58) = 2479.09, p < .0001, MSE = 0.05. 
Similarly, participants recognized critical lures at different rates across the lists.  
Participants recognized critical lures at a higher rate on lists 1-8 (M = .67, SD = .23) than 
lists 9-16 (M = .55, SD = .21), F (1, 58) = 562.5, p < .0001, MSE = 0.16.  Participants 
recognized critical lures at a lower rate on lists 9-16 than lists 17-24 (M = .64, SD = .24), 
F (1, 58) = 493.75, p < .0001, MSE = 0.17. Participants recognized critical lures at a 
higher rate on lists 17-24 than lists 25-32 (M = .63, SD = .26), F (1, 58) = 493.75, p < 
.0001, MSE = 0.16.  Further, participants recognized critical lure at a higher rate on lists 
1-8 than on lists 17-24, F (1, 58) = 621.42, p < .0001, MSE = 0.17.  Finally, participants 
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recognized critical lure at a lower rate on lists 9-16 than on lists 25-32, F (1, 58) = 
430.97, p < .0001, MSE = 0.19. 
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Lists Overall High Low Neutral 
Correct Recognition of Studied Items 
1-8 .71 (.13) .72 (.12) .71 (.14) .71 (.11) 
9-16 .72 (.13) .72 (.12) .71 (.15) .74 (.12) 
17-24 .8 (.12) .81 (.13) .79 (.13) .79 (.11) 
25-32 .76 (.14) .80 (.13) .76 (.14) .72 (.12) 
Total .75 (.10) .76 (.10) .74 (.11) .74 (.09) 
False Recognition of Critical Lures 
1-8 .67 (.23) .68 (.23) .71 (.23) .61 (.23) 
9-16 .55 (.21) .55 (.22) .60 (.19) .51 (.22) 
17-24 .64 (.24) .58 (.23) .71 (.28) .63 (.20) 
25-32 .63 (.26) .56 (.27) .71 (.23) .60 (.28) 
Total .62 (.19) .60 (.20) .67 (.20) .59 (.18) 
 
Table 2.  Means (Standard Errors) of Probability of Recognition. 
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Figure 5.  Actual results for the recognition of studied items (top panel) and critical lures 
(bottom panel). 
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Remember, know and guess judgments were calculated for each subject for 
studied items recognized as old as well as critical lures falsely recognized as old.  The 
probability of a remember, know or guess judgment was then calculated for lists 1-8, 9-
16, 17-24, and 25-32 which is presented in Table 4.  
A 3 (Item: Remember, Know, Guess) x 4 (List: 1-8, 9-16, 17-24, 25-32) x 3 
(Condition: High, Low, Neutral) x 2 (Test: Recall, Recognition) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed.  A main effect of item was significant, F (2,110) = 15.20, p < 
.0001, MSE = .43.  Contrasts revealed that the remember judgments (M = .43, SD = .21) 
and know judgments (M= .37, SD = .21) were not significantly different (p > .05), but 
both remember and know judgments occurred at higher rates than guess judgments (M = 
.20, SD = .13).  The test-by-item interaction was also significant, F (2,110) = 26.15, p < 
.0001, MSE = .15.  Contrasts revealed that studied items were identified as old (M = .52, 
SD = .27) significantly more than critical lures (M = .33, SD = .23), p <0.05.  In addition, 
studied items were identified as guessed significantly less (M = .12, SD = .08) than 
critical lures (M = .28, SD = .22), p < 0.05.  There was no difference between studied 
items and critical lures identified as known.  Finally, the item-by-list interaction achieved 
significance, F (6, 330) = 2.25, p = .0383, MSE = 13.03 and is displayed in Figure 6. 
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Lists Remember Know Guess 
Studied Items 
1-8 .49 (.29) .37 (.29) .14 (.13) 
9-16 .51 (.27) .37 (.28) .11 (.09) 
17-24 .56 (.30) .36 (.29) .09 (.07) 
25-32 .52 (.28) .35 (.29) .13 (.11) 
Total .52 (.27) .36 (.27) .12 (.08) 
Critical Lures 
1-8 .34 (.28) .38 (.28) .28 (.28) 
9-16 .26 (.26) .42 (.28) .31 (.28) 
17-24 .36 (.31) .34 (.29) .30 (.28) 
25-32 .37 (.30) .39 (.28) .24 (.26) 
Total .33 (.23) .39 (.20) .28 (.22) 
 
Table 4.  Means (Standard Errors) of Probability of Remember, Know, and Guess 
Judgments.  
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Figure 6.  Proportion of remember, know, and guess responses by list. 
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Pre- and Post-test Memory Questionnaires 
A 2 (Test: Pretest vs. Posttest) x 3 (Condition: High, Low, Neutral) repeated 
measures of analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the overall ratings on the 
pre- and post-test memory questionnaire.  A test by condition interaction was obtained, F 
(2, 57) = 13.39, p < .0001, MSE = 42.55.  The high-confidence group showed lower 
memory confidence on the pre-test questionnaire (M = 65.15, SD = 7.44) than on the 
post-test questionnaire (M = 71.32, SD = 7.59), F (1, 19) = 16.82, p < .001, MSE = 22.67, 
whereas the low-confidence group showed greater memory confidence on the pre-test 
questionnaire (M = 67.0, SD = 10.42) than on the post-test questionnaire (M = 58.3, SD = 
13.23), F (1, 19) = 14.48, p < .01, MSE = 52.27.  The neutral-confidence group showed 
no change in memory confidence from pre-to post-test (p > .001). 
A 2 (Test: Pretest vs. Posttest) x 3 (Condition: High, Low, Neutral) repeated 
measures analysis of variance was performed on ratings obtained from question 1 (On a 
scale from 1 to 10, how would you rate your overall memory ability?) in the pre-test 
memory questionnaire and question 2 in the post-test memory questionnaire (Now that 
you've completed our memory tests, how would you rate your overall memory ability on 
a scale from 1 to 10).  A main effect of test was obtained, F (1, 57) = 12.46, p < .001, 
MSE = 1.27 as well as a condition by test interaction, F (2, 57) = 6.61, p < .01, MSE = 
1.27.  Specifically, the low-confidence group showed higher confidence in general 
memory ability on the pre-test questionnaire (M = 6.9, SD = 1.48) than on the post-test 
questionnaire (M = 5.3, SD = 1.22) whereas the high and neutral confidence groups 
showed no differences in ratings between the two tests (both ps > 0.05). 
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Separate 2 (Pre- vs. Post-Test) x 3 (Condition: High, Low, Neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were performed on the ratings obtained from each subheading of 
question 2 (On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate your memory ability for: keys, faces, 
names, phone numbers you just checked, phone numbers you use frequently, personal 
dates, words, remembering where your car is parked) in the pre-test memory 
questionnaire and question 3 (Now that you've completed our memory tests, please rate 
your memory ability on a scale from 1 to 10 for: keys, faces, names, phone numbers you 
just checked, phone numbers you use frequently, personal dates, words, remembering 
where your car is parked) in the post-test memory questionnaire.  Table 5 displays the 
ANOVA results for each test.   
Main effects of test were observed on the following questions: general, keys, 
faces, phone numbers just checked, phone numbers frequently used, words, and car. In 
general, ratings of memory confidence decreased for each question from pre- to post-test.  
Main effects of condition were also found on the following questions: phone number just 
checked, phone numbers used frequently, and cars.  These effects were qualified by 
significant 2-way interactions on the following questions: general, phone numbers just 
checked, words, and car.  For each question, memory confidence did not change between 
pre- and post-test for the high confidence group, whereas memory confidence 
significantly decreased between pre- and post-test for the low and neutral groups (all ps < 
0.05).  
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 Means (SE) 2 x 3 ANOVA F-Values 
 Pre-Test Post-Test 
Variable High Low Neut High Low Neut 
Cond Test Test x 
Cond 
General 6.35 
(1.5) 
6.9 
(1.48) 
6.75 
(1.65) 
6.58 
(1.14)
5.3 
(1.22) 
5.95 
(1.05) 
.57 12.46* 6.61** 
Keys 6.95 
(1.57) 
7.15 
(2.08) 
6.95 
(1.9) 
7.35 
(1.44)
5.8 
(5.8) 
6.25 
(1.29) 
 
 7.46 ٭8.65 0.99
Faces 8.25 
(.97) 
8.2 
(1.85) 
8.85 
(1.18) 
6.85 
(1.79)
7.6 
(1.73) 
7.4 
(1.39) 
 
0.95 36.91** 2.12 
Names 5.35 
(1.98) 
5.7 
(2.32) 
6.35 
(2.68) 
5.2 
(1.44)
6.55 
(2.11) 
5.9 
(1.33) 
 
1.51 .11 2.47 
Phone 
Number 
Just 
Checked 
6.65 
(2.16) 
6.75 
(2.07) 
6.3 
(2.23) 
7.7 
(1.13)
4.5 
(2.26) 
6.3 
(1.19) 
4.88* 8.18* 16.78**
Phone 
Number 
Frequent 
Used 
9.2 
(.95) 
9.0 
(1.3) 
8.85 
(1.53) 
8.95 
(1.0) 
7.3 
(2.15) 
7.65 
(1.35) 
3.48* 28.32** 4.64 
Dates 7.25 
(2.31) 
7.35 
(7.87) 
7.05 
(2.39) 
7.4 
(1.9) 
6.55 
(1.79) 
6.65 
(1.23) 
 
.044 1.85 1.14 
Words 7.05 
(1.36) 
7.2 
(1.91) 
7.0 
(2.13) 
6.4 
(1.27)
4.7 
(2.08) 
5.35 
(1.53) 
 
1.61 35.58** 3.97* 
Car 8.1 
(1.71) 
8.75 
(1.37) 
8.45 
(1.19) 
8.55 
(1.15)
5.37 
(2.63) 
6.5 
(1.24) 
**20.00 ٭٭42.56 *4.74
*p < .005   **p < .001 
 
Table 5.  Means (Standard Errors) and F-values for the Pre and Post-Test Questionnaires 
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Rey-Osterrieth, Intense Concentration, Digit Span, and Digit Symbol Substitution. 
 Z-scores were calculated separately for the Rey-Oysterrieth Test, the Intense 
Concentration game, the Digit Span, and Digit Symbol Substitution tests in order to 
compare participant’s performance across each test.  The resultant z-scores were 
submitted to a 3 (Condition: High, Low, Neutral) x 4 (Test: RO, IC, DS, DSS) repeated 
measures ANOVA.  No significant main effects or interactions were obtained (p > .001).  
In addition, separate ANOVAs were performed on each memory test to evaluate the 
effect of condition on test performance.  Again, no significant main effects or interactions 
were obtained (p > .001). 
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SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
SUMMARY 
   The false memory phenomenon first revealed by Deese (1957) and further 
examined by Roediger and McDermott (1995) has proven to be a robust phenomenon.  
Many of the studies following Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) revival of the study 
of false memories have shown that it is difficult to eliminate false memories.  In fact, 
studies have shown that presentation rates, encoding and retrieval modality, 
distinctiveness, repetition, retrieval delay, social and developmental factors, and even 
informing participants of the false memory effect alter the magnitude, but do not 
eliminate the false memory effect.  From this large body of research, it is clear that 
false memories are difficult if not impossible to abolish.   
The present study sought to examine the extent to which a participant’s 
confidence in their overall memory ability would influence the production of false 
memories.  In addition, the present study explored the extent to which fluctuations in 
memory confidence influenced fluctuations in the false memory phenomenon.   
Hypothesis I 
It was predicted that participants would show higher rates of correct recall for 
studied items as compared to critical lures, as shown in previous research (e.g., 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  In addition, participants were expected show higher 
rates of false recall of critical lures than non-studied intrusions.  This hypothesis was 
confirmed. 
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Hypothesis II 
It was predicted that if memory confidence affects recall, then the recall rate of 
studied items would change after each manipulation for both the high and low 
confidence groups.  That is, the high confidence group should recall more studied 
items from lists 9-16 and 25-32 than from the lists 1-8 and 17-24, and should recall 
fewer studied items from lists 17-24 than any other list.  The low confidence group 
should recall more studied items on lists 17-24 and than any other list.  The low 
confidence group should also recall fewer studied items on lists 9-16 and 25-32 than 
from lists 1-8 and 17-24.  The neutral group should not change in the amount of 
studied items recalled on any of the lists.  If memory confidence affects recall, then 
memory confidence was anticipated to have a similar effect on the recall of critical 
lures.   
The results obtained from this study did not confirm these predictions.  
Specifically, the ANOVA performed on the probability of correct recall of studied 
items for each set of lists did not revealed a main effect of list no main effect of 
condition, and no condition by list interaction.   
Although no formal predictions were made, it was anticipated that false recall 
of critical lures would be similarly affected by the memory manipulation than studied 
items.  In fact, the results from the ANOVA performed on the critical lures were 
similar to studied items.  No main effect of condition or list, and no condition by list 
interaction were obtained.     
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Hypothesis III 
Previous research (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995) has shown higher rates 
of correct recognition for studied items as compared to critical lures.  In addition, it 
was anticipated that higher rates of false recognition of critical lures would be 
observed compared to non-studied items.  This hypothesis was confirmed. 
Hypothesis IV 
It was predicted that if memory confidence affects recognition, then the 
recognition of studied items and critical lures would change after each manipulation 
for both the high and low confidence groups.  The high confidence group should 
recognize more studied items from lists 9-16 and 25-32 than from the lists 1-8 and 17-
24, and should recognize fewer studied items from lists 17-24 than any other list.  The 
low confidence should recognize more studied items from lists 17-24 and than any 
other list.  The low confidence group should also recognize fewer studied items from 
lists 9-16 and 25-32 than from lists 1-8 and 17-24.  The neutral group should not 
change in the amount of studied items recognized on any of the lists.   
These predictions were not confirmed.  The ANOVA performed on the 
recognition of studied items indicated a main effect of list, but no main effect of 
condition and no condition by list interaction.  Similar to the recall data, there were 
differences in the rates of recognition as the number of lists increased, but these 
differences were similar for participants in the low, neutral, and high confidence 
conditions.  Specifically, recognition probabilities remained stable from lists 1-8 to 9-
16 but increased on lists 17-24 and then decrease again on lists 25-32 but not to the 
base level found with lists 1-8 and 9-16.   
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Again, although no specific predictions were made, it was expected that the 
recognition of critical lures would be affected by the confidence manipulation.  This 
expectation was not borne out by the data.  There was a significant decrease in the 
false recognition of critical lures for lists 1-8 to 9-16, while the remaining lists - lists 
1-8, 17-24 and 25-32 – showed similar rates of false recognition of critical lures.  No 
main effect of condition or condition by list interaction was observed. 
Hypothesis V 
It was expected that participants would make more remember judgment on 
studied items recognized as old, than critical lures recognized as old, consistent with 
results obtained by Roediger and Mc Dermott (1995).  In addition, it was expected that 
more know responses would be made on critical lures identified as old than studied 
items recognized as old.  The results from this study were somewhat different than the 
results obtained by Roediger and McDermott (1995), in that remember judgments and 
know judgments were not significantly different, but both remember and know 
judgments occurred at higher rates than guess judgments. However, studied items 
were identified as old significantly more than critical lures, as predicted.  Studied 
items were also identified as guessed significantly less than critical lures.  Contrary to 
predictions, there was no difference between studied items and critical lures identified 
as known.   
It was also anticipated that participants in the high confidence condition would 
make more remember than know responses, and participants in the low confidence 
condition would make more know responses than remember responses.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, no differences were observed between the confidence groups in terms of 
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the frequencies of remember and know responses.  However, the number of guess 
responses was significantly less than both remember and know responses, irrespective 
of the confidence group. 
DISCUSSION 
The present experiment was designed to evaluate the extent to which the false 
memory phenomenon was related to metamemory, or one’s confidence in one’s own 
memory ability.  Before evaluating the effects of the confidence manipulation on the 
false memory phenomenon, one must establish the extent to which the confidence 
manipulation was successful.   
Participants in the high confidence condition showed an increase in scores 
from the pre-test to the post-test memory questionnaire, indicating that they had higher 
ratings of their own memory ability after the confidence manipulations.  In contrast, 
participants in the low confidence condition showed a decrease in scores from the pre-
test to the post-test memory questionnaire, indicating that they had lower ratings of 
their own memory ability at the end of the study.  Participants in the neutral condition 
showed no difference between the two tests.  These results provide evidence of an 
effective confidence manipulation. 
However, analyses on the three variables manipulated on the pre-and post-test 
questionnaire – names, phone numbers just checked, and words – did not show 
consistent evidence that the confidence manipulation was successful in altering 
participants’ meta-memory for these specific items.  Specifically, there was no 
changed in the participants’ belief to remember names, while phone numbers just 
checked did change in the predicted fashion, and the ratings for their ability to 
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remember words decreased across all conditions. Thus, even though participants’ 
perceptions in their general memory abilities seemed to be influenced by the 
confidence manipulation, the manipulation did not appear to consistently modify 
participants’ beliefs about their memory abilities for specific items.   
In light of evidence suggesting at least some effect of the confidence 
manipulation on meta-memory, the primary goal of evaluating the effects of memory 
confidence on false memory production can be evaluated.   Although participants 
showed a higher probability of correctly recalling and recognizing studied items as 
compared to critical lures, and a higher probability of false recall and recognition of 
critical lures than non-critical intrusions, consistent with previous research, no 
significant effects of memory confidence were observed on recall or recognition of 
critical lures.   
Several explanations may be provided for why memory confidence did not 
moderate recall or recognition of critical lures in the present study.  The first 
possibility is that although general differences in memory confidence were elicited by 
the confidence manipulation, the manipulation may have been too weak to affect recall 
and recognition. It may be that participants did not entirely believe the feedback they 
received from the experimenter about their memory performance on each test.  
Alternatively, participants may have internalized the feedback from the experimenter, 
but getting such feedback only once was not enough to affect recall and recognition.  
Experiments designed to manipulate the number or amount of consistent feedback are 
necessary to explore this possibility.  
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Another possible reason why the confidence manipulation did not moderate 
recall or recognition of studied items or critical lures may have to do with the 
generalizability of the manipulation itself.  That is, perhaps the confidence 
manipulation was successful in altering participants’ meta-memory, but those 
alterations in memory confidence did not generalize beyond the specific memory tests 
used in the manipulation.  For example, the WAIS-R Digit Span Subtest was used in 
conjunction with the variable phone numbers just checked.  It is possible that 
participants’ confidence in remembering phone numbers was affected by the 
manipulation, although no direct evidence was collected to determine whether this was 
the case.  Because participants’ memory abilities were not tested memory for phone 
numbers, but on recall and recognition of list information, the effect of the confidence 
manipulation did not generalize more broadly.  This hypothesis could be tested in two 
ways: 1) test abilities specific to the tasks used in the confidence manipulation, and 2) 
conduct an experiment that manipulates confidence using lists (i.e., make the 
confidence manipulation task more like the actual memory task).  The final possibility 
is that one’s confidence in one’s own memory ability is unrelated to the production of 
false memories.  That is, participants’ confidence in their memory has no impact on 
their memory accuracy.  Therefore any manipulation done that causes the participants’ 
confidence in their memory to be altered would not have an impact on their recall and 
recognition of studied items and critical lures.   
Although the results revealed the manipulation was not successful in 
moderating the recall and recognition of critical lures, there is a possibility that the 
manipulation did have a more general affect.  Metamemory is believed to be able to 
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influence more general recall and recognition of items, and a comparison to the 
reported rates of recall and recognition by Roediger and McDermott (1995) revealed 
that although the rate of recall and recognition of studied items and critical lures were 
similar to those found by Roediger and McDermott (1995), they report higher rates of 
recognition (.79) of studied items and considerably higher rates of recall (.55) and 
recognition (.81) of critical lures than those that were found in this study (recognition 
of studied items = .75; recall of critical lures = .37; recognition of critical lures = .62).  
Such a finding may be attributed to the memory manipulation.  Specifically, the post-
test memory questionnaires indicated participants, overall, lost confidence in their 
memory.  This may have manifested itself in lower rates of recall and recognition of 
studied items and critical lures. 
An alternative explanation for this difference may be presentation modality.  
Roediger and McDermott (1995) presented the words aurally, while in the present 
study they were presented visually.  Maylor and Mo (1999) found that fewer critical 
lures were recalled when the lists were presented visually than when they were 
presented aurally.  In addition, they also found that correct recognition of studied 
items was higher with auditory presentation than with visual presentation, although 
they also reported higher rates of recognized critical lures with visual presentation.  
Future studies manipulating metamemory should evaluate if aural or visual 
presentation modalities affects the recall and recognition of studied items and critical 
lures by using a within-subjects design using both visual and aural presentations. 
Future studies concerning the relationship between memory confidence and 
false memory research should, first, evaluate if individuals who have low confidence 
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in their memory are more susceptible to false memory construction than individuals 
who have a lot of confidence in their memory.  By evaluating confidence in one’s own 
memory as a state vs. trait characteristic, one would be able to better evaluate how 
confidence and false memory construction are related.   
Another possibility would be to concentrate on the different tasks and memory 
tests that could be used in attaining a manipulation of the participants’ metamemory.  
As mentioned previously, the tests that were used in this study may not have 
succeeded.  There are a wide variety of tests and tasks that could be used that perhaps 
will be more successful than the ones used in the present study.  One possibility would 
be utilizing tests with stronger face validity with the construct being manipulated.  
Perhaps it would a strong manipulation would occur if the construct being 
manipulated would be memory in general, instead of the participants’ memory for 
specific tasks.   
In addition to using different tests to manipulate the participants’ memory 
confidence, changing the way the memory tests are used could be another direction in 
research.  This study attempted to manipulate the participants’ confidence through 
common real-world scenarios.  Perhaps just using their performance on the memory 
test, without associating it with a real-world task, would be more effective.   
There has been little research outside of eyewitness testimony studies that 
concentrate on the proposition that one’s confidence in one’s own memory has an 
effect on performance.  There are no scales to measure individuals’ confidence in their 
memory, and there are no studies that relate this confidence in memory to performance 
in memory tasks.  Further research in these areas should be devoted to establishing 
 
85 
how much memory confidence or metamemory can affect memory performance.  If it 
can be shown that metamemory does or does not moderate performance, then it would 
be easier to determine the extent to which memory confidence affects false memory 
production.  
In conclusion, one can conclude there was some evidence that the memory 
manipulation had some affect on metamemory.  However, there is evidence that the 
memory manipulation was not strong enough to conclude that variations in meta-
memory are unrelated to the recall or recognition of studied items or critical lures.  
The false memory phenomenon has found to be very robust in a variety of situations, 
and it remains to be seen if a stronger manipulation concerning the confidence in one’s 
own memory would have any effect on the false memory construction.   
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Appendix A 
Health Questionnaire 
General 
1)  What is your date of birth?  _______________________ 
2)  What is your sex? (circle one)  Male  Female 
3)  How many years of formal education have you completed?  __________ 
     (12 years=high school diploma; 16 years=college graduate) 
 
Because many of the projects we conduct are federally funded, we are required to ask 
about your ethnicity or racial background.  You have the right to decline to answer the 
question that follows and if you do chose to decline, you will not be penalized in any 
way. 
 
4)  What is your ethnicity or race?   
 ___  Caucasian (not of Hispanic descent) 
 ___  Asian  
 ___  American Indian 
 ___  African American 
 ___  Hispanic 
 ___  Other 
 
Sensory-Motor 
1)  Do you wear glasses or contacts?      Yes  No 
     If so, do you wear them for:     Reading
 Driving  
2)  When was the last time you saw your eye doctor? _____________________________ 
3)  Do you have problems with cataracts or glaucoma  Yes  No 
4)  Have you ever had eye surgery?     Yes  No 
     If so, describe 
__________________________________________________________ 
5)  Do you have problems with tunnel vision or some other 
      restriction of your visual field?     Yes  No 
6)  Can you see well out of both of your eyes?   Yes  No 
7)  Do you have any problems moving your fingers or arms? Yes  No 
8)  Do you have a tremor?      Yes  No 
     If so, how sever is the tremor?  ____________________________________________ 
     Does it affect your ability to write?      Yes  No 
 
Medical 
1)  Are you presently under a physician’s care?   Yes  No 
     If not, when was the last time you saw a doctor?  _____________________________ 
2)  Have you been hospitalized within the last five years?  Yes  No 
     If so, for what condition(s)  ______________________________________________ 
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3)  Have you ever had a heart attack or heart surgery?  Yes  No 
     If so, describe  ________________________________________________________ 
4)  Has a doctor ever said that you have: 
 a)  congestive heart failure     Yes  No 
 b)  diabetes       Yes  No 
 c)  kidney disease      Yes  No 
 d)  thyroid disease      Yes  No 
Neurological 
1)  Have you ever seen a neurologist or neurosurgeon?  Yes  No 
 
2)  Have you ever had a sudden temporary problem 
      with your vision, hearing, speech, memory, or  
      ability to move?       Yes  No 
3)  Have you ever been knocked unconscious for more 
     than 15 minutes?       Yes  No 
4)  Has a doctor ever said that you have 
 a) had a stroke       Yes  No 
 b) a brain tumor      Yes  No 
 c) a brain infection such as encephalitis or meningitis Yes  No 
 d) epilepsy or seizures     Yes  No 
 e) Parkinson’s Disease     Yes  No 
 f) Huntington’s Disease     Yes  No 
 g) multiple sclerosis      Yes  No 
 h) Alzheimer’s disease     Yes  No 
  i) any other type of head injury    Yes  No 
 
Psychiatric 
1)  Have you ever seen a psychiatrist, psychologist, or counselor? Yes  No 
2)  Have you ever had problems with depression?   Yes  No 
 
Medications and Lifestyle 
1)  Approximately how many alcoholic beverages do you drink in an average week?  
__________ 
2)  Have you ever had a problem with alcohol or drugs?   Yes 
 No 
3)  Do you take recreational drugs (e.g., marijuana, cocaine)  Yes 
 No 
4)  Are you currently taking any prescription or over-the-counter 
     medications?        Yes 
 No 
    If so, what medications are you taking? 
     
Miscellaneous 
1)  Do you have any physical, emotional, or mental disabilities?  Yes 
 No 
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      If so, describe  
_______________________________________________________________ 
2)  Do you have any health problems that you think might influence 
      your ability to participate in psychology experiments?   Yes 
 No 
     If so, describe  
________________________________________________________________  
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Appendix B 
Memory Questionnaire 
 
1. On a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1=poor and 10=excellent), how would you rate your 
overall memory ability?  ____________ 
 
2. On a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1=poor and 10=excellent), please rate your memory 
ability for:  
 
 a)   where you put things (e.g. keys)    _______ 
 b)   faces              _______ 
c)   names              _______ 
 d)   phone numbers you just checked    _______         
 e)   phone numbers used frequently          _______ 
f)    personal dates (e.g. birthdays)            _______ 
 g)   words              _______ 
 h)   remembering where you parked your car   _______ 
 
3. As far as your memory ability is concerned,  
what do you think is your greatest strength?   
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Your greatest weakness?   
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C 
List 1 (Black) - 28 
1. white 
2. dark 
3. cat 
4. charred 
5. night 
6. funeral 
7. color  
8. grief 
9. blue 
10. death 
11. ink 
12. bottom 
13. coal 
14. brown 
15. gray 
FAS = .130 
 
List 4 (foot)-25 
1. shoe 
2. hand 
3. toe 
4. kick 
5. sandals 
6. soccer 
7. yard 
8. walk 
9. ankle 
10. arm 
11. boot 
12. inch 
13. sock 
14. smell 
15. mouth 
FAS = .177 
 
 
 
 
List 2 (Chair)-31 
1. table 
2. sit 
3. legs 
4. seat 
5. couch 
6. desk 
7. recliner 
8. sofa 
9. wood 
10. cushion 
11. swivel 
12. stool 
13. sitting 
14. rocking 
15. bench 
 FAS = .303 
 
List 5 (girl) - 9 
1. boy 
2. dolls 
3. female 
4. young 
5. dress 
6. pretty 
7. hair 
8. niece 
9. dance 
10. beautiful 
11. cute 
12. date 
13. aunt 
14. daughter 
15. sister 
FAS =.097 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 3 (doctor) 
1. nurse 
2. sick  
3. lawyer 
4. medicine 
5. health 
6. hospital 
7. dentist 
8. physician 
9. ill 
10. patient 
11. office 
12. stethoscope 
13. surgeon 
14. clinic 
15. cure 
FAS =  .245 
 
List 6 (High) - 10 
1. low 
2. clouds 
3. up 
4. tall 
5. tower 
6. jump 
7. above 
8. building 
9. noon 
10. cliff 
11. sky 
12. over 
13. airplane 
14. dive 
15. elevate 
FAS =.087 
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List 7 (mountain) -12 
 
1. hill 
2. valley 
3. climb 
4. summit 
5. top 
6. molehill 
7. peak 
8. plain 
9. glacier 
10. goat 
11. bike 
12. climber 
13. range 
14. steep 
15. ski 
FAS =.154 
 
 
 
List 10 (rough)-30 
 
1. smooth 
2. bumpy 
3. road 
4. tough 
5. sandpaper 
6. jagged 
7. ready 
8. coarse 
9. uneven 
10. riders 
11. rugged 
12. sand 
13. boards 
14. ground 
15. gravel 
FAS =.122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 8 (needle) - 18 
 
1. thread 
2. pin 
3. eye 
4. sewing 
5. sharp 
6. point 
7. prick 
8. thimble 
9. haystack 
10. thorn 
11. hurt 
12. injection 
13. syringe 
14. cloth 
15. knitting 
FAS =.203 
 
 
 
List 11 (sleep) -18  
 
1. bed 
2. rest 
3. awake 
4. tired 
5. dream 
6. wake 
7. snooze 
8. blanket 
9. doze 
10. slumber 
11. snore 
12. nap 
13. peace 
14. yawn 
15. drowsy 
FAS =.431 
List 9 (man) -16 
 
1. woman 
2. husband 
3. uncle 
4. lady 
5. mouse 
6. male 
7. father 
8. strong 
9. friend 
10. beard 
11. person 
12. handsome 
13. muscle 
14. suit 
15. old 
FAS =.115 
 
 
 
List 12 (slow) -3 
 
1. fast 
2. lethargic 
3. stop 
4. listless 
5. snail 
6. cautious 
7. delay 
8. traffic 
9. turtle 
10. hesitant 
11. speed 
12. quick 
13. sluggish 
14. wait 
15. molasses 
FAS =.172 
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List 13 (soft) - 11 
 
1. hard 
2. light 
3. pillow 
4. plush 
5. loud 
6. cotton 
7. fur 
8. touch 
9. fluffy 
10. feather 
11. furry 
12. downy 
13. kitten 
14. skin 
15. tender 
FAS =.179 
 
 
List 16(thief) - 8 
 
1. steal 
2. robber 
3. crook 
4. burglar 
5. money 
6. cop 
7. bad 
8. rob 
9. jail 
10. gun 
11. villain 
12. crime 
13. bank 
14. bandit 
15. criminal 
FAS =.100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 14 (spider) - 14 
 
1. web 
2. insect 
3. bug 
4. fright 
5. fly 
6. arachnid 
7. crawl 
8. tarantula 
9. poison 
10. bite 
11. creepy 
12. animal 
13. ugly 
14. feelers 
15. small 
FAS =.159 
 
 
List 17 (anger) - 2 
 
1. mad 
2. fear 
3. hate 
4. rage 
5. temper 
6. fury 
7. ire 
8. wrath 
9. happy 
10. fight 
11. hatred 
12. mean 
13. calm 
14. emotion 
15. enrage 
FAS =.157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 15 (sweet) - 4 
 
1. sour 
2. candy 
3. sugar 
4. bitter 
5. good 
6. taste 
7. tooth 
8. nice 
9. honey 
10. soda 
11. chocolate 
12. heart 
13. cake 
14. tart 
15. pie 
FAS =.172 
 
List 18 (army) 
 
1. navy 
2. soldier 
3. Unites States 
4. rifle 
5. Air Force 
6. draft 
7. military 
8. Marines 
9. march 
10. infantry 
11. captain 
12. war 
13. uniform 
14. pilot 
15. combat 
FAS =.135 
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 List 19 (bread)-29 
 
1. butter 
2. food 
3. eat 
4. sandwich 
5. rye 
6. jam 
7. milk 
8. flour 
9. jelly 
10. dough 
11. crust 
12. slice 
13. wine 
14. loaf 
15. toast 
FAS =.200 
 
 
 
 
List 22 (car) - 15 
 
1. truck 
2. bus 
3. train 
4. automobile 
5. vehicle 
6. drive 
7. jeep 
8. ford 
9. race 
10. keys 
11. garage 
12. highway 
13. sedan 
14. van 
15. taxi 
FAS = .347 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 20 (city) - 13 
 
1. town 
2. crowded 
3. state 
4. capital 
5. streets 
6. subway 
7. country 
8. New York 
9. village 
10. metropolis 
11. big  
12. Chicago 
13. suburb 
14. county 
15. urban 
FAS =.185 
 
 
List 23 (cold) -7 
 
1. hot 
2. snow 
3. warm 
4. winter 
5. ice 
6. wet 
7. frigid 
8. chilly 
9. heat 
10. weather 
11. freeze 
12. air 
13. shiver 
14. arctic 
15. frost 
FAS = .353 
 
 
 
List 21 (flag) - 19 
 
1. banner 
2. American 
3. symbol 
4. stars 
5. anthem 
6. stripes 
7. pole 
8. wave 
9. raised 
10. national 
11. checkered 
12. emblem 
13. sign 
14. freedom 
15. pendant 
FAS =.109 
 
 
 
 
List 24 (fruit) 
 
1. apple 
2. vegetable 
3. orange 
4. kiwi 
5. citrus 
6. ripe 
7. pear 
8. banana 
9. berry 
10. cherry 
11. basket 
12. juice 
13. salad 
14. bowl 
15. cocktail 
FAS = .202 
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List 25 (king)-23 
 
1. queen 
2. England 
3. crown 
4. prince 
5. George 
6. dictator 
7. palace 
8. throne 
9. chess 
10. rule 
11. subjects 
12. monarch 
13. royal 
14. leader 
15. reign 
FAS = .230 
 
 
 
List 28 (lion) - 5 
 
1. tiger 
2. circus 
3. jungle 
4. tamer 
5. den 
6. cub 
7. Africa 
8. mane 
9. cage 
10. feline 
11. roar 
12. fierce 
13. bears 
14. hunt 
15. pride 
FAS = .136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 26 (music) - 6 
 
1. note 
2. sound 
3. piano 
4. sing 
5. radio 
6. band 
7. melody 
8. horn 
9. concert 
10. instrument 
11. symphony 
12. jazz 
13. orchestra 
14. art 
15. rhythm 
FAS = .227 
 
 
 
List 29 (pen) -22 
 
1. pencil 
2. write 
3. fountain 
4. leak 
5. quill 
6. felt 
7. bic 
8. scribble 
9. crayon 
10. cross 
11. tip 
12. marker 
13. red 
14. cap  
15. letter 
FAS =.135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 27 (river) 
 
1. water 
2. stream 
3. lake 
4. Mississippi 
5. boat 
6. tide 
7. swim 
8. flow 
9. run 
10. barge 
11. creek 
12. brook 
13. fish 
14. bridge 
15. winding 
FAS = .147 
 
 
 
List 30 (rubber)-24 
 
1. elastic 
2. bounce 
3. gloves 
4. tire 
5. ball 
6. eraser 
7. springy 
8. foam 
9. galoshes 
10. soles 
11. latex 
12. glue 
13. flexible 
14. resilient 
15. stretch 
FAS = .033 
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List 31(smell)-21 
 
1. nose 
2. breathe 
3. sniff 
4. aroma 
5. hear 
6. see 
7. nostril 
8. whiff 
9. scent 
10. reek 
11. stench 
12. fragrance 
13. perfume 
14. salts 
15. rose 
FAS = .290 
 
 
         List 34 (smoke)-25 
 
1. cigarette 
2. puff 
3. blaze 
4. billows 
5. pollution 
6. ashes 
7. cigar 
8. chimney 
9. fire 
10. tobacco 
11. stink 
12. pipe 
13. lungs 
14. flames 
15. stain 
FAS = .167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 32 (trash)- 27 
 
1. garbage 
2. waste 
3. can 
4. refuse 
5. sewage 
6. bag 
7. junk 
8. rubbish 
9. sweep 
10. scraps 
11. pile 
12. dump 
13. landfill 
14. debris 
15. litter 
FAS = .140 
 
 
List 35 (shirt) - 1 
 
1. blouse 
2. sleeves 
3. pants 
4. tie 
5. button 
6. shorts 
7. iron 
8. polo 
9. collar 
10. vest 
11. pocket 
12. jersey 
13. belt 
14. linen 
15. cuffs 
FAS =.186 
 
 
 
 
List 33 (cup) - 20  
1. mug 
2. saucer 
3. tea 
4. measuring 
5. coaster 
6. lid 
7. handle 
8. coffee 
9. straw 
10. goblet 
11. soup 
12. stein 
13. drink 
14. plastic 
15. sip 
FAS =.109 
 
 
          List 36 (window)-32 
 
1. door 
2. glass 
3. pane 
4. shade 
5. ledge 
6. sill 
7. house 
8. open 
9. curtain 
10. frame 
11. view 
12. breeze 
13. sash 
14. screen 
15. shutter 
FAS = .184 
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List 37 (short) 
1. tall 
2. long 
3. fat 
4. small 
5. hair 
6. stout 
7. stocky 
8. shirt 
9. stubby 
10. little 
11. dwarf 
12. tiny 
13. midget 
14. curt 
15. brief 
FAS =? 
 
 
 
List 40 (whistle) 
1. stop 
2. train 
3. noise 
4. sing 
5. blow 
6. loud 
7. shrill 
8. toot 
9. tweet 
10. siren 
11. tin 
12. pucker 
13. lips 
14. bell 
15. holler 
FAS = .005 
 
List 38 (wish) 
1. want 
2. desire 
3. hope 
4. well 
5. think 
6. star 
7. bore 
8. ring 
9. wash 
10. thought 
11. money 
12. true 
13. Christmas 
14. birthday 
15. fairy 
FAS = .012 
 
 
 
List 41 (carpet) 
1. rug 
2. floor 
3. red 
4. sweeper 
5. tack 
6. bagger 
7. room  
8. house 
9. thick 
10. sweep 
11. wool 
12. plush 
13. weave 
14. Persian 
15. vacuum 
FAS =.037 
 
List 39 (whiskey) 
1. drink 
2. drunk 
3. beer 
4. liquor 
5. gin 
6. bottles 
7. alcohol 
8. scotch 
9. wine 
10. rum 
11. bourbon 
12. drunkard 
13. brandy 
14. booze  
15. Irish 
FAS = .022 
 
 
 
List 42 (square) 
1. round 
2. circle 
3. block 
4. box 
5. root 
6. triangle 
7. cube 
8. rectangle 
9. time 
10. geometry 
11. corner 
12. oblong 
13. mile 
14. angle 
15. dumb 
FAS =? 
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List 43 (Earth) 
1. round 
2. dirt 
3. ground 
4. moon 
5. planet 
6. world 
7. land 
8. soil 
9. sun 
10. heaven 
11. Mars 
12. Universe 
13. star 
14. sphere 
15. quake 
FAS = ? 
 
 
 
List 46 (cabbage) 
1. lettuce 
2. salad 
3. food 
4. eat 
5. green 
6. garden 
7. leaf 
8. sauerkraut 
9. slaw 
10. patch 
11. plant 
12. soup 
13. ham 
14. head 
15. stew 
FAS =? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 44 (eagle) 
1. bird 
2. fly 
3. scout 
4. wings 
5. nest 
6. bald 
7. hawk 
8. beak 
9. soar 
10. feathers 
11. flight 
12. coin 
13. clan 
14. eye 
15. falcon 
FAS = ? 
 
 
 
List 47 (Bible) 
1. God 
2. book 
3. church 
4. religion 
5. holy 
6. read 
7. Jesus 
8. Christ 
9. Moses 
10. faith 
11. prayer 
12. testament 
13. word 
14. lord 
15. psalms 
FAS =? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 45 (moon) 
1. stars 
2. sun 
3. light 
4. shine 
5. beam 
6. bright 
7. glow 
8. romance 
9. full 
10. crescent 
11. tide 
12. face 
13. telescope 
14. luna 
15. astronomy 
FAS = ? 
 
 
 
List 48 (hammer) 
1. nail 
2. saw 
3. hit 
4. pound 
5. tool 
6. carpenter 
7. iron 
8. chisel 
9. build 
10. beat 
11. throw 
12. sledge 
13. repair 
14. thumb 
15. heavy 
FAS =?
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List 1 -8: 
1. shirt 
2. anger 
3. slow 
4. sweet 
5. lion 
6. music 
7.cold 
8.thief 
 
  
 List 17-24 
17. needle 
18. sleep 
19.flag 
20. cup 
21. smell 
22. pen 
23. king 
24. rubber 
 
 
 
Lists not presented: 
river 
army 
fruit 
short 
wish 
whiskey 
doctor 
hammer 
 
List 9-16 
9.girl 
10. anger 
11. soft 
12. mountain 
13. city 
14. spider 
15. car 
16. man 
 
 
List 25-32 
25. foot 
26. smoke 
27. trash 
28. black 
29. bread 
30. rough 
31. chair 
32. window 
 
 
 
 
whistle 
carpet 
square 
earth 
eagle 
moon 
cabbage 
bible 
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Appendix G 
Recognition Test 
 
 
Instructions: For every word, decide if it has been presented (old) or not (new).  If the 
word is old make the distinction if you remember the word, you know or guess it. 
Remembering the words indicates you remember something specific about the 
word (for example where it was in the list or remember picturing the word). 
Knowing the word means that you can't remember any specifics, but you know 
the word was presented, and guessing means you are guessing the word was on 
one of the lists. 
 
 
Word (circle one) 
Remember (R)/ Know (K)   or 
Guess (G) 
1.  anger old new   
2.  tender old new   
3.  old old new   
4.  pie old new   
5.  siren old new   
6.  bed old new   
7.  elastic old new   
8.  patch old new   
9. banana old new   
10.  man old new   
11.  note old new   
12.  whiskey old new   
13.  infantry old new   
14.  door old new   
15.  whistle old new   
16.  barge old new   
17.  physician old new   
18.  cabbage old new   
19.  animal old new   
20.  stain old new   
21.  shirt old new   
22.  table old new   
23.  flow old new   
24.  cold old new   
25.  eagle old new   
26.  rug old new   
27.  rough old new   
28.  beak old new   
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29.  nose old new   
30.  God old new   
31.  shutter old new   
32.  Chicago old new   
33.  sip old new   
34.  scotch old new   
35.  litter old new   
36.  soft old new   
37.  doctor old new   
38.  slow old new   
39.  rose old new   
40.  enrage old new   
41.  monarch old new   
42.  pendant old new   
43.  thread old new   
44.  pipe old new   
45.  nap   old new   
46.  rum old new   
47.  downy old new   
48.  bread old new   
49.  soil old new   
50.  city old new   
51.  letter old new   
52.  want old new   
53.  town old new   
54.  banner old new   
55.  quick old new   
56.  rubber old new   
57.  smell old new   
58.  climber old new   
59.  highway old new   
60.  stool old new   
61.  king old new   
62.  heaven old new   
63.  belt old new   
64.  cherry old new   
65.  breeze old new   
66.  sauerkraut old new   
67.  toast old new   
68.  foot old new   
69.  crescent old new   
70.  garbage old new   
71.  blouse old new   
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72.  apple old new   
73.  butter old new   
74.  flag old new   
75.  river old new   
76.  chisel old new   
77.  lettuce old new   
78.  window old new   
79.  hot old new   
80.  pencil old new   
81.  nail old new   
82.  mean old new   
83.  sleeves old new   
84.  Christ old new   
85.  molasses old new   
86.  fast old new   
87.  moon old new   
88.  cup old new   
89.  romance old new   
90.  wish old new   
91.  glue old new   
92.  stars old new   
93.  Marines old new   
94.  heart old new   
95.  pride old new   
96.  thief old new  
97.  army old new   
98.  low old new   
99.  trash old new   
100.  hammer old new   
101.  rectangle old new   
102.  sweet old new   
103.  nurse old new   
104.  high old new   
105.  hard old new   
106.  marker old new   
107.  chair old new   
108.  water old new   
109.  sister old new   
110.  spider old new   
111.  stein old new   
112.  criminal old new   
113.  slice old new   
114.  stop old new   
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115.  drink old new   
116.  round old new   
117.  little old new   
118.  carpet old new   
119.  crime old new   
120.  knitting old new   
121.  date old new   
122.  patient old new   
123.  black old new   
124.  girl old new   
125.  tiger old new   
126.  air old new   
127.  boy old new   
128.  music old new   
129.  handsome old new   
130.  mountain old new   
131.  jazz old new   
132.  emblem old new   
133.  short old new   
134.  fruit old new   
135.  toot old new   
136.  fierce old new   
137.  taxi old new   
138.  dump old new   
139.  shoe old new   
140.  ski old new   
141.  rhythm old new   
142.  stretch old new   
143.  injection old new   
144.  sleep old new   
145.  sweep old new   
146.  Bible old new   
147.  truck old new   
148.  bottom old new   
149.  woman old new   
150.  gray old new   
151.  small old new   
152.  beat old new   
153.  bird old new   
154.  hill old new   
155.  over old new   
156.  smooth old new   
157.  dirt old new   
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158.  mad old new   
159.  navy old new   
160.  needle old new   
161.  lion old new   
162.  geometry old new   
163.  tall old new   
164.  car old new   
165.  elevate old new   
166.  white old new   
167.  ring old new   
168.  sour old new   
169.  faith old new   
170.  drowsy old new   
171.  web old new   
172.  steal old new   
173.  feathers old new   
174.  pen old new   
175.  frost old new   
176.  mug old new   
177.  gravel old new   
178.  inch old new   
179.  shirt old new   
180.  queen old new   
181.  urban old new   
182.  square old new   
183.  fragrance old new   
184.  house old new   
185.  bench old new   
186.  thought old new   
187.  earth old new   
188.  sand old new   
189.  cigarette old new   
190.  reign old new   
191.  smoke old new   
192.  mouth old new   
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Appendix H 
 
Memory Questionnaire 
 
1. On a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1=poor and 10=excellent), how well do you think 
you performed on our memory tests overall?  ____________ 
 
2. Now that you've completed our memory tests, how would you rate your overall 
memory ability on a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1=poor and 10=excellent)?  
____________ 
 
3. Now that you've completed our memory tests, please rate your memory ability on 
a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1=poor and 10=excellent) for:  
 
 a)   where you put things (e.g. keys)    _______ 
 b)   faces              _______ 
c)   names              _______ 
 d)   phone numbers you just checked    _______         
 e)   phone numbers used frequently          _______ 
f)    personal dates (e.g. birthdays)            _______ 
 g)   words              _______ 
 h)   remembering where you parked your car   _______ 
 
4. Now that you've completed our memory tests, please consider your overall 
memory ability.  What do you think is your greatest strength?   
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Your greatest weakness?   
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Below, describe what do you think this experiment is about. 
 
 
 
 
 
